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I NTRODUCTION

If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few
who are rich.
- John Fitzgerald Kennedy1

Summum ius summa iniuria.
-Cicero2

* The author wishes to dedicate this Note to the late Dr. David McKillop - a professor,
mentor, and friend. His life's work lives on in the deeds of his students.

1. Inaugural address (Jan. 20, 1961) (transcript available in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Library).
2. M. TULL! CICERONIS, DE OFFICllS I, 14 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) ("Extreme justice
is extreme injustice.").
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The political outcry over prescription drug costs has been one of
the most vociferous in recent memory. From tales depicting renegade
seniors sneaking cheap prescriptions of Vioxx out of Tijuana across
the border,3 to the promises of reduced prices made by front-runners
during the 2000 Presidential election,4 the calls for lower drug prices
have been forceful and demanding. This war for lower-priced pharma
ceuticals fo ught by consumers, interest groups and politicians against
the pharmaceutical industry itself has recently developed yet another
front. The latest battle is over Medicaid.5 The new victims are the
poor.
Presently, federal statutory provisions in the Medicaid program
provide relief from high drug prices through a mandatory rebate
mechanism.6 Federal law requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to
rebate their drugs sold to Medicaid recipients at a minimum level of
15.1 percent of the average manufacturer's price of those drugs.7 In
addition to the mandatory rebate, fe deral law provides for the discre
tionary provision of prior authorization by which the states may serve
the best interests of their Medicaid recipients in a cost-effective man
ner.8 The federal Medicaid program allows states to condition pre
scription of a covered drug on special prior authorization of that drug
with a state official.9 Both the mandatory rebate and prior authoriza
tion provisions serve to balance access and cost in' an attempt to pro
vide necessary care for the indigent.10
In the face of mounting pressure over rising drug prices, several
states sought to expand the federal rebate and prior authorization
3. Tim Weiner, Low Prices for Unregulated Prescription Drugs Lure Americans, N.Y.
TIMES INT'L, Aug. 14, 2001, at A7.
4. Alan Bernstein, Presidential Election Left Dimples All Over Y2, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Dec. 31, 2000, at Al (noting that Governor Bush and Vice-President Gore nar
rowly tailored their messages to capture the numerous voters concerned with high prescrip
tion drug prices).
5. Congress created the sister programs of Medicaid and Medicare under Title XIX and
Title XVIII, respectively, of the Social Security Act of 1965. Medicaid, a federal-state
matching program, pays for the medical expenses of low-income persons. In essence, the no
ble goal of Medicaid is "to ensure access to health care for low income Americans." TEX.
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM'N, TEXAS MEDICAID IN PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2002).
See also infra Part I for a more detailed description of the nature and political history of the
Medicaid program.
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8 (West 2000).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(c)(l)(B)(i)(V) (West 2000).
8. 42 U.S.C.A.§ 13%r-8(d)(5) (West 2000).
9. For example, a state could declare Rogaine subject to prior authorization. As a con
sequence of this designation, any time a physician prescribed Rogaine she would have to
make a telephone request to a state commission. Only after permission by the commission
could the drug be prescribed. The commissioner must respond by telephone or another tele
communication device within 24 hours of the request. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(d)(5)(A)
(West 2000).
10. See infra Section J.B.
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provisions in order to ft�rther reduce pharmaceutical prices for Medi
caid beneficiaries.11 The most legally controversial of these state pro
grams has been the "Maine Rx Program" ("Maine Program").12 Under
the Maine Program, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of
Human Services negotiates to obtain rebates above and beyond those
required by federal law with pharmaceutical manufacturers.13 Al
though these rebates are voluntary, those non-compliant manufactur
ers are subject to prior authorization for their particular non
complying drugs.14 Thus, Maine in effect uses the prior authorization
as an incentive or a leverage device for extracting supplemental re
bates from manufacturers for its citizens.15
With the advent of the Maine Program in May 2000, controversy
ensued. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") quickly filed suit in the District Court of Maine16 arguing:
(1) the prior authorization provision was preempted by federal Medi
caid law; and (2) the mandatory rebate provision was an extraterrito
rial regulation in violation of the dormant commerce clause of the
Constitution.17 PhRMA asserted that the use of prior authorization as
11. For example, Vermont, Maine, Florida, and Michigan. See Theresa Agovino, States
seek ways to Reduce Cost of Drugs, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25521619
(describing Florida's, Missouri's, and Maryland's programs as well as the proposal for a
multi-state buying consortium); Russell Gold et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sues Michigan
to Block Attempt to Cut Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A2 (describing the
Michigan program and the litigation by PhRMA in Michigan, Vermont, Maine and Florida).
12. M E. REV. STAT. ANN . tit. 22§ 2681 (West 2001).
13. See Joan Henneberry, Addendum to State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs: The
Maine Rx Program, at www.nga.org/center/divisions/1,1188,C_ISSUE_BRIEF11D_2287,00.
html (Aug. 3, 2001).
14. Id.
15. In addition to the rebate and prior authorization provisions, the Maine Program also
contained another controversial element. The Maine Program prohibited unconscionable
prices and unreasonable profits by manufacturers. ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 22, § 2697(2)
(West 2001). This outrageous provision, however, was immediately deemed an unconstitu
tional regulation of out-of-state manufacturers' revenues in violation of the dormant com
merce clause. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv. , No.
00-157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4-5 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) [hereinafter
Commissioner]. This provision is not discussed in the course of this Note for two reasons.
First, extraterritoriality will be analyzed extensively in the course of the discussion on the
rebate provision. That extraterritorial analysis can be cross-applied to the unreasonable
profit provision. Second, the state of Maine never appealed the District Court's ruling on
this issue. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 72 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001).
Therefore, it is unlikely that other states will use the illegal profiting provision in enacting
any similar price reduction Medicaid programs. As a result, the provision does not have the
appeal of general application to warrant extensive discussion.
.

16. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Com
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The
dormant commerce clause is in effect a "negative" Commerce Clause prohibiting states from
interfering with interstate commerce in the absence of congressional regulation. See Letter
from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (noting that the Commerce Clause
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a leverage device ran contrary to the clear congressional intent limit
ing the use of prior authorization to curbing over-prescription of un
necessary medication.18 Therefore, PhRMA contended, federal Medi
caid law governing prior authorization and the congressional intent
behind that provision should preempt the Maine Program. PhRMA
also argued that the supplemental state rebate provision under the
Maine Program unconstitutionally regulated transactions between
manufacturers and wholesalers that took place wholly out-of-state.19
As a result, PhRMA asserted that such an extraterritorial regulation
violated the dormant commerce clause.20 In Pharmaceutical Research
& Manufacturers of America v. Commissioner, Maine Department of
Human Services, the District Court of Maine agreed with PhRMA on
both the preemption and dormant commerce clause claims.21 On ap
peal, however, the First Circuit in Pharmaceutical Research &
Manufacturers of America v. Concannon22 reversed on both points of
law and upheld the Maine Program. The Supreme Court, realizing the
significance of the dispute, granted certiorari in June of 2002.23
The Maine Program presents a novel method for dealing with high
prescription drug prices for Medicaid recipients and the public at
large. Due to the potential of such a programs to cut Medicaid costs,
other states have watched and continue to follow closely the litigation
over the Maine Program as they attempt to formulate similar stat
utes.24 Thus, the legality of the Maine Program may be of great conse
quence for many states and their strategies in combating escalating
pharmaceutical prices.25 Since the Maine Program and other similar
"was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purpose of the General Gov
ernment . . . . ). For an example of the Supreme Court's first major encounter in developing
the doctrine, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
"

18. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20.
19. Id. at *13-17.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *4-5.
22. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
23. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 122 S.Ct. 2657 (2002).
24. For example, in 2001 Florida passed the State Medicaid Formulary Law ("Florida
Program"). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.912 (West 1998). The Florida Program requires drug
manufacturers to provide rebates as a condition to get their products onto the state Medicaid
formulary. PhRMA Goes to Coun Over Florida Rebates, MARKETLETTER, Aug. 20, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 9080194. Those non-complying manufacturers will have their
non-complying drugs subject to prior authorization. Id. PhRMA is currently in the midst of
challenging this statute as well. The District Court judge recently ruled against PhRMA and
upheld the program. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Medows, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1 186
(N.D. Fla. 2001). PhRMA is preparing an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. See Jan Faiks,
Press Release, Jan. 2, 2002, at www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/l/02.01.2002.320
.cfm.
25. In fact, Michigan most recently enacted a prior authorization statute patterned after
the Maine Program. See 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 60; see also Jan Faiks, Press Release, Nov. 30,

606

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101 :602

programs that tie supplemental rebates to prior authorization may
serve as revolutionary statutory models for the rest of the nation,26 as
sessing the constitutionality of such statutes and the litigation arising
under the Maine Program is of tremendous importance.27 In particular,
the most salient legal issues regarding preemption and the dormant
commerce clause require attention.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution28 provides the doctrinal
basis for preemption claims. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, any
state law running contrary to Acts of Congress must yield to those
federal acts.29 Preemption claims normally fit into one of three catego
ries: express,30 implied field,31 and implied conflict preemption.32 Im
plied conflict preemption is the relevant preemption claim in the case
of a Medicaid dispute over a prior authorization state statute.33
2001, at www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releasesl//30.ll.2002.316.cfm. PhRMA challenged
the Michigan law in state court in Michigan. See Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Mich.
Dep't of Cmty. Health, No. 01-94627-AZ, 2002 WL 27746 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2002); see also
PhRMA v. Michigan Dep't of Cmty. Health, at www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/
30.11.2001.317.cfm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002). The court there struck down the law and
ruled that the state agency went beyond its statutory authority in creating the program, and
that the program also violated the Michigan state constitution. Jan Faiks, Press Release, Jan.
7, 2002, at www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releasesl//07.0l.2002.321 .cfm. The Michigan
litigation provides a unique approach in challenging state prior authorization statutes: as
violations of state statutory and constitutional provisions. The analysis in this Note dealing
with the federal constitutional issues of the Maine statute can also be applied to the
Michigan program, which similarly ties voluntary rebates to prior authorization.
26. See Daniel B. Moskowitz, Maine's Threat of Drug Price Controls ls a Model for
Other States' Lawmakers, MEDICINE & HEALTH, June 28, 2001, at 2Sl ( 'As Maine goes, so
goes the nation.' "); see also Maine Appeals Halt on its Rx Plan: Hopes for Expedited Review
to Meet Jan I Start, MARKETLETTER, Nov. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7544245 (stating
that roughly twenty-eight other states are planning to introduce legislation similar to
Maine's).
"

27. Although discussion will focus primarily on the Maine Program, this Note refers to
"prior authorization statutes" generally - those statutes that tie rebates to prior authoriza
tion - with the hope of broadening the applicability of the analysis.
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
29. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1 824).
30. Express preemption occurs where there is explicit preemptive language by Congress
to take exclusive control of a certain field. Gade v. Nat'I Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S.
88, 98 (1992).
31. Implied field preemption occurs where the entire federal regulatory framework is
"so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
32. Implied conflict preemption takes place, in the absence of express preemptive lan
guage, either where congressional intent dictates that "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or where such intent demonstrates that the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941 ).
33. Federal law does not expressly prohibit states from enacting prior authorization and
additional rebate laws. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1 396r-8 (West 2000) . Therefore, express preemp-
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Since the conflict is implicit in implied conflict cases, ascertainment
of congressional intent is of paramount importance in assessing these
claims.34 A mere fragment or a strained inference depicting congres
sional intent is not enough to preempt a state law.35 The presumption
is against preemption,36 and only when congressional intent is shown
to be "clear and manifest" will that presumption be rebutted and pre
emption found.37
Due to the integral role of congressional intent in implied conflict
preemption cases, the interpretive devices used to ascertain intent may
be crucial to the discovery of Congress's clear and manifest purposes.
Consequently, whether a judge is committed to a textualist or a pur
posive paradigmatic framework38 may result in the use of widely
varying legislative materials and ultimately result in different findings
regarding preemption.39 Similarly, the nature of the statute involved
may lend guidance as to the discovery of true congressional intent and
a finding for preemption.4° For example, in the case of Medicaid, the
statute embodies a delicate balance of compromises between medical
professionals, patients, manufacturers, federal legislators, and state in
terests.41 Therefore, identifying the inherent nature of the statute at
tion does not apply. Additionally, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program. See MARK R.
DANIELS, Introduction: The Inconsistency and Paradox of American Health Care, in
MEDICAID REFORM AND THE AMERICAN STATES 3 (Mark R. Daniels ed., 1998). Therefore
field preemption is not the appropriate category as the states occupy a very large part of the
Medicaid regulatory scheme. Thus, the relevant preemption category is one of implied con
flict - whether the state prior authorization statutes stand as obstacles to the accomplish
ment and execution of the full congressional purposes and objectives behind Medicaid. The
First Circuit also recognized that only implied conflict preemption was at stake in assessing
the Maine Program. The court stated: "There is no explicit language in the Medicaid statute
that forbids the Maine Rx Program. Nor is the doctrine of 'field' preemption relevant, as
Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program . . . . Therefore, we consider only im
plied conflict preemption as a basis for PhRMA's argument." Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of
Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001).
34. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 ("The question of whether a certain state action is pre
empted by federal law is one of congressional intent."); see also Retail Clerks lnt'I Ass'n v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (noting that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone" in preemption cases).
35. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra Section I.A for a discussion of the textualist and purposive interpretive ap
proaches.
39. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 853 (1997); see also Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Pre
emption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1153 (1998)
(characterizing Boggs as dealing with the outcome-determinative interpretive debate over
textual and purposive approaches in an implied preemption context).
40. See, e.g., Int') Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (recognizing the balanced
nature of the Clean Water Act in its preemption analysis); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (taking into account the nature of the avocado quality
regulation in its preemption inquiry).
41. See infra Section J.B.
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hand may provide guidance to a judge seeking to interpret that statute
in a manner consonant to the underlying nature and the corresponding
purpose behind the various legislative compromises.
In addition to the preemption issue, programs like Maine's come
under constitutional attack as violations of the dormant commerce
clause. The dormant commerce clause forbids states from unduly bur
dening interstate commerce even in the absence of specific congres
sional regulation.42 Courts analyze state statutes under varying levels
of scrutiny corresponding to the degree a statute facially discriminates
against out-of-staters.43 Of pertinence to this Note are two specific
categories of laws: laws that regulate extraterritorially44 and laws that
are facially neutral.45
The preemption and dormant commerce clause issues serve as the
largest stumbling blocks in the passage of statutes like the Maine Pro
gram. Clearing these constitutional hurdles is necessary before such
programs can become a reality and a long-lasting solution to high pre
scription drug prices. This Note contends that these constitutional
hurdles cannot be cleared. Part I argues that the state prior authoriza
tion statutes are preempted by federal Medicaid law. Part II then con
tends tliat the state prior authorization statutes violate the dormant
commerce clause of the Constitution because they regulate extraterri
torially and alternatively fail under a dormant commerce clause bal42. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY &
WAITE (1937). See generally Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA.
L. R EV. l (1940); Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power - Revised Version,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1947); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protection
ism: Making Sense ofthe Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. R EV. 1091 (1986).
43. See Eule, supra note 42.
44. The Supreme Court has held that state laws that extraterritorially regulate out-of
state conduct of business are per se unconstitutional. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324
(1989); CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982). Such statutes project legislation onto other states and therefore burden interstate
commerce by undermining state sovereignty. See Brown-Foreman, 476 U.S. at 582-83. As a
result, extraterritorial laws are subject to strict scrutiny.
45. Laws that regulate commerce by facially treating in-slaters and out-of-staters alike
are held to the lowest level of scrutiny - the balancing test. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Under the balancing test, the burdens imposed by the state law on
commerce are weighed against its benefits. Id. If those burdens are clearly excessive in con
trast to the putative local benefits, then the law is struck down in violation of the dormant
commerce clause. Id.
In applying a balancing test to a state statute, due to the broad discretion of the test, it is
crucial to place the appropriate items in the balance. In addition to traditional items regard
ing effects on commerce, judicial concerns and ideals behind dormant commerce clause the
ory may serve to tip the balance. Such judicial concerns vary, but include, among other
things, interpreting statutes to guard against protectionism, or to encourage national uni
formity, or to advance the interests of vulnerable minorities. See generally Regan, supra note
42 (discussing judicial concerns within the rubric of the dormant commerce clause). These
concerns may be as weighty as the effects on commerce.
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ancing test.46 This Note concludes that state prior authorization stat
utes, such as the Maine Program, are unconstitutional devices that also
fail to provide an appropriate remedy for high prescription drug
prices.
I.

THE S TRONG MEDICINE OF PREEMPTION

In examining prior authorization statutes, such as the Maine Pro
gram, the key issue in the preemption context is ascertaining congres
sional intent. If the state statutes "stand[ ] as ... obstacle[s]" in the ac
complishment of federal objectives, then courts must find such statutes
preempted under implied conflict preemption standards.47 Determin
ing congressional intent is not, however, an easy task. Moreover,
seemingly multiple expressions of congressional intent confound and
confuse the inquiry in light of varying interpretive theories.48 This Part
argues that, subsequent to a court adopting a more paradigmatic and
politically contextual approach in searching for congressional intent,
the prior authorization statutes will be deemed to run contrary to that
congressional intent and preempted by federal law. Section I.A argues
that adopting a purposive interpretive theory in examining the rela
tionship between the federal Medicaid statute and the state laws prop
erly fulfills the judiciary1s role within the legislative process and leads
to the conclusion of preemption. Section I.B argues that Medicaid is a
delicate balance of compromises and that courts must find preemption
in order to preserve the series of compromises that embody the fed
eral legislation.
A. A Purposive Framework: The Search for Intent
The two major statutory interpretive theories that battle within the
juridical theatre are textualism and intentionalism.49 A court adopting

46. The Supreme Court has, however, in the past balanced an extraterritorial statute
rather than automatically deem it per se unconstitutional. See Edgar, 457 U.S. 624. There
fore, it may be inappropriate to consider balancing and extraterritoriality as alternative
standards. Nonetheless, many of the extraterritorial cases dispense with balancing alto
gether. See supra note 44 (listing cases). Moreover, there may be a presumption against bal
ancing developing on the Court. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (pos
iting that a balancing test is "ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken
rarely if at all").

47. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
48. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Patterson v. McLean: Updating Statutory In
terpretation, 87 MICH . L. REV. 20 (1988) (discussing the numerous models of statutory inter
pretation).
49. Id. at 22. For excellent discussion on the competing views on textualism, see Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), and HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT
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a textualist approach to statutory interpretation looks to the plain
meaning of the statute - usually exclusively and at the expense of the
legislative history - in order to determine the legislature's intent in
enacting the statute.50 Intentionalism, on the other hand, posits that
contextual analysis is necessary to discern the full meaning of the stat
ute's terms.51 One intentionalist model, known as purposivism, uses
the context of the statute's text, legislative history, and circumstances
surrounding enactment in order to discover the broad purposes em
bodied in the legislation and to fit those purposes into the entire fabric
of the law.52 The purposive judge operates from the premise - some
times troubling to textualists and public choice scholars - that the
legislature acted with a purpose.53 This Section first argues that pur
posivism is the more jurisprudentially sound interpretive theory within
the preemption setting54 in that it allows the judiciary to fulfill its role
within the legislative process. Only by focusing on the interpretive de
bate first can a court confidently venture into the ambiguities of the
Medicaid statute armed with the most appropriate and powerful
weapons from its paradigmatic arsenal. That is, the arguments ad
vancing purposivism must be firmly established before a court can
grapple with the heart of the legal controversy over prior authoriza
tion.
From this interpretive starting point, this Section then directly con
fronts the difficulties of the prior authorization statutes and argues
that federal law preempts the Maine Program and similar prior
authorization state statutes. A critical analysis, in light of a purposive
framework, of the Maine Program and the two related judicial opin
ions concludes that the First Circuit used a myopic textual approach
and failed to take into account the legislative history dealing with prior
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) on purposivism.
50. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 23.
51. Id.
52. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1202-05; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1124-25.
53. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 26; see also HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1125;
Jodan, supra note 39, at 1204. For a discussion on public choice theory and the possible in
consistencies with the doctrine of purposivism, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Poli
tics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74
VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986);
Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49
U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory
and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68
TUL. L. REV. 803 (1994).
54. Whether or not purposivism is the better interpretive approach in general is an issue
that falls outside of the purview of this Note. This Note argues that, within the limited setting
of implied conflict preemption cases involving Medicaid disputes, purposivism serves as the
stronger interpretive paradigm.
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authorization and the context of other states' implementation of prior
authorization in accordance with this legislative history.
1.

The Doctrinal Formulation

Purposivism provides the strongest interpretive foundation for as
sessing preemption disputes. A court's adoption of a purposive ap
proach is better than the utilization of a textual one in examining pre
emption questions in general and Medicaid disputes in particular.55 .
Purposivism allows the judiciary to fulfill its role as an active partici
pant in the lawmaking process - a role especially important in the
context of preemption.56 This view is based upon the Founders' belief
that each branch of government is interdependent in its contribution
to the deliberative and lawmaking process.es.57 This judicial role be
comes of supreme importance in the preemption setting because
courts are the only bodies that can properly manage federalism con
cerns - the very concerns at the foundation of preemption conflicts.58
Because Congress "cannot, ex ante, draft meaningful preemption pro
visions . . . [and] Congress has demonstrated an inability to modify the
language of preemption provisions even in light of judicial decisions
pointing out textual inadequacies," then it logically follows that "Con
gress is even less likely to manage federalism in the implied preemp
tion context."59
Purposivism, furthermore, provides judges with the ability to go
outside of the inadequacies of the text in finding legislative intent, thus
better managing federalism concerns. Congress is simply unable to
imagine every undesirable application of its statutory provisions in or
der to evince an explicit preemptive intent.60 A purposive judge can
seek guidance from legislative history and the overall context of the
55. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1192 ("[A]lthough a textual approach to statutory interpre
tation may be sound in many contexts, the approach is unsatisfactory in the context of pre
emption.").
56. Id. at 1219; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 426 (1989) (noting that "resort to purpose was an effort to maintain the
role of the courts as agents of the legislature while at the same time acknowledging the in
adequacy of textualism").
57. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997); JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3.5 (5th ed. 1995) (explaining the interdependence and in
termingling between the branches and refuting the notion that the three branches operate
separately in compartmentalized spheres - all in culinary terms: "While people sometimes
refer to the three branches of the federal government as a three-layer cake, it is more accu
rate to think of it as a marble cake"); Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220.
58. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1218-19.
59. Id.; see also Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ER/SA Pre
emption? A Case Study ofthe Failure of Text11alism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 96 (1 996).
60.

Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220.
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legislation within the grand legal setting in order to determine
Congress's purposes. A textualist judge, on the other hand, would be
forced to abandon her role in adjudicating federalism disputes in the
absence of textually explicit intent.61 Purposivism is the superior inter
pretive framework in implied preemption cases generally because its
enhanced interpretive devices better accommodate Congress's limita
tions in statutory creation and amendment.
In addition, in the particular implied preemption case involving a
Medicaid dispute, purposivism provides the superior paradigm. Often
the degree of judicial activism in preemption cases will depend on the
federal law at issue.62 Medicaid requires an especially heightened judi
cial role because of the pervasive and inherent federalism concerns
found within the administration, nature, and history of the program.63
In describing the nature of the Medicaid program, one political theo
rist notes:
Federalism, a fundamental feature of American governance, profoundly

shapes Medicaid. The j oint responsibility of the national and state gov

ernments for funding and implementing the program has enmeshed it in
perennial debates about the appropriate division of labor, or balance of
64

power, between levels of government in the federal system.

In addition, the political history of Medicaid has been a tumultuous
one with the federal-state relationship constantly changing.65 An un
derstanding of the greater legal fabric and historical context of the
Medicaid program allows for a more involved judicial search focusing
on the true spirit and meaning of the law.66 Medicaid, due to its history
61. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and
Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 280 (1997) ("[T)extualism may actually
frustrate the legislature's design, particularly when a statute is applied in circumstances not
expressly contemplated by the legislature, because the statute's words will not always convey
the full import of the legislature's policy choices.").
62. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220.
63. Michael H. Armacost, Foreword, in MEDICAID AND DEVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM
THE STATES, at vii (Frank J. Thompson & John J. Diiulio Jr. eds., 1998).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed Care Regulatory Chaos Through a
Restructured Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327, 329-30 (2001):

While Medicaid affords states' discretion concerning the scope of benefits and administra
tion of their respective programs, the program operates under federal oversight, and the his
tory of this dually administered enterprise has been one of contention between the respec
tive levels of government. In particular, federal and state regulators most often disagree
about funding, and over the years they have had a series of intergovernmental disputes re
lated to joint financing responsibilities which have accelerated with heightened federal man
dates being placed on state Medicaid programs.
See generally JEAN DONOVAN GILMAN, MEDICAID AND THE COSTS OF FEDERALISM, 19841992 (1998) (describing the changing federal-state relationship within Medicaid).
66. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892), for the purposiv
ist motto that a "thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
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and nature, demands a more searching judicial inquiry designed to up
hold the spirit of the law and maintain the federalism issues found
therein.
While the textualist judge would argue that the purposive ap
proach only leads to judicial over-reaching and impermissible legis
lating,67 such concerns are exaggerated and unwarranted in the pre
emption context. The textualist j udge contends that her purposivist
colleague can easily abandon the statutory text in order to impute a
purpose that could easily be a judicial one not envisioned by the leg
islature.68 The textual approach, on the other hand, serves the ideals of
judicial restraint by keeping the legislative role in the hands of
Congress and not the court.69 The textual approach purports to har
ness the dangers of judicial lawmaking by preventing judicial consulta
tion of legislative materials and the social context of the statute.70 Al
though the concern over judicial over-reaching is noteworthy, it can be
eased and refuted - at least in the preemption context - in three dif
ferent ways.
First, a purposivist judge does not abandon the text, but rather
looks to extra-textual materials only after finding that the text is am
biguous as to the statute's purpose.71 Judicial restraint in the form of
deference to the text still remains in a purposive world. Those "pur
posivist" judges who seek to manipulate the text through the expan
sion of interpretive factors grossly misapply purposive theory.72 These
same manipulators could just as easily manipulate under the guise of
67. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original In
tent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 62-3 (1988) (the search for
intent "greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court"); cf Orrin
Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 43, 47 (1988) (positing that in constitutional adjudication the legislative history "often

provide[s] the only restraint upon an expansive and inaccurate interpretation of what (the
constitutional] clauses were originally drafted to accomplish").
68. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28; A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dan
gerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1071, 1083
(1988) (stating that "[a]rmed with an attribution of the statute's general purpose, the court

can adapt the text of the statute to changing circumstances without, one assumes, too much
concern for the embarrassments of specific language."); Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at
817 ("Because a purposivist judge willingly posits a reasonable legislature - an assumption
that is not necessarily valid in all instances - she can hardly guarantee that the purposes she
discerns represent the actual purposes of the enacting body.").
69. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 23.
70. Id. ("By restricting courts to the language of the statute, textualism attempts to pre

vent the creative judicial lawmaking that can occur when judges consult legislative materials
and the social context of the statute.").

71. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28-29 (arguing that "Hart and Sacks advocated con
textual analysis as the way to resolve the ambiguities inherent in language"); Gebbia-Pinetti,
supra note 61, at 284-85 (noting that a purposivist judge "first examines the statutory lan
guage, because the text is the best evidence of the legislature's intent or the statute's pur
pose").
72. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28-29.
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the textualist framework - albeit with fewer tools - in order to meet
their purposes.73 Thus, the textualist's concerns for the primacy of the
text and the prohibition against manipulation and de facto judicial
legislating are still safeguarded under a purposive approach.
Second, grasping onto the face of the text without regard to the
depth of congressional intent can lead to strained interpretations that
are wholly inaccurate.74 It is the search for accuracy that requires in
creased judicial involvement through a purposive framework. If the
text is ambiguous, the purposivist judge uses legislative history and
other extra-textual materials in order to interpret the statute.75 The
textualist would argue against the use of such materials and would ac
cept a "substantial margin of error in identifying legislative will" for
the sake of restraint.76 Under the purposivist framework, "an increase
in accuracy is purchased at the price of greater opportunities for judi
cial policymaking."77 The trade-off between restraint and accuracy,
however, is far from equal.
The inaccuracies of'textualism can produce contrived interpreta
tions that lack coherence and are based on unnatural inferences.78
Moreover, the benefits of restraint found through the abandonment of
extra-textual devices are illusory. As one legal scholar notes:
We should not insulate ourselves from the context in which legally sig
nificant words were uttered if we care about ascertaining what the
speaker intended to convey. Whether we see this upon our initial reading
of the document (intrinsic ambiguity), or only later after we have con
ducted adequate investigation (extrinsic ambiguity) is ultimately of little
significance. 79

The reason that such distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic ambi
guities become seemingly irrelevant is that the introduction of context
into the interpretive melting pot does not eliminate or create new in
terpretations; rather context makes some interpretations "more salient
73. In fact, some scholars argue that textualism needs restraint from a different form of
manipulation. See A. Michael Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due
Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 689 n.8 (1992) ("[J]udicial re
straint should prevent the Court from elevating its affinity for linguistic simplicity and con
sistency across the statutory lands�ape over Congressional intent.").
74. See Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textua/ism in Statutory
Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 258.
75. See Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 816.
76. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 27.
77. Id.
78. Solan, supra note 74, at 258.
79. Id. at 256; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26364 (1990) (describing the failure to examine context in evaluating textual clarity as the "plain
meaning fallacy"). For an example of Posner's "plain meaning fallacy," see Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989).
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and others less salient."80 Therefore, the benefits of restraint derived
from abandoning extra-textual devices are limited and yet serve to
undermine the ascertainment of accurate results.
Finally, the concern over excess judicial involvement is misplaced
in the preemption setting. Preemption calls for more j udicial involve
ment because preemption disputes can be characterized as judicial in
nature insofar as they involve the allocation of authority.81 As opposed
to the creation of laws for th.e regulation of conduct, preemption deals
with federal-state relations and the potential invalidation of laws.82
Such a topic is one for judicial eyes; therefore, textualism hampers the
judiciary from becoming involved in a realm that demands heightened
judicial responsibility.
Thus, purposivism is a superior interpretive theory to textualism in
preemption disputes because it allows the court to manage federalism
concerns in an area of law - Medicaid - that desperately needs such
management. Although the textualist judge argues for a more re
strained approach in order to keep the judiciary in check, ultimately
her concerns are overstated relative to purposivist theory. Moreover,
the textualist judge sacrifices accuracy for limited checks on judicial
over-reaching, and undermines the inherently judicial task of assessing
preemption disputes.
2.

Purposive Application: The Maine Rx Program

Application of the purposive approach to the conflict between the
Maine Program and federal Medicaid law clearly demonstrates that
the Maine Program must be preempted. A critical analysis of the First
Circuit decision in Concannon83 demonstrates that the First Circuit
ignored the clear legislative history, the subsequent state statutes, and
the proposed regulations by the Health Care Financing Administra
tion ("HCFA") evincing the purpose of prior authorization embodied
in that history. By taking these three important factors into account,
the Maine law stands as an obstacle to the execution and accomplish
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
The statutory text of the federal Medicaid program is silent as to
the situations in which prior authorization may be implemented. Fed
eral Medicaid law explicitly provides for prior authorization under
limited circumstances.84 The statutory language alone, however, fails
80. Solan, supra note 74, at 256-57.
81. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220.
82. Id.
83. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
84. Federal law states: "A state plan under this title . . . may require . . . the approval of
the drug before its dispensing . . . only if the system providing for such approval . . . provides
response by telephone or other telecommunication device within 24 hours of a request for
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to provide Congress's intentions as to the limitations on the use of
prior authorization. Standing alone, the text might stand for the ideal
that prior authorization may be implemented for any purpose.
An examination of the legislative history, however, shows that
Congress had a specific and limited scope for prior authorization. The
House Reports illuminate that Congress intended states only to have
the option of imposing prior authorization in order to safeguard
against unnecessary over-prescription of drugs and to provide for a
proper balance of quality and economy.85 As the District Court of
Maine noted, "It may have never occurred to Congress that the Medi
caid program could be hijacked to provide leverage for other pur
poses . . . . Maine's Rx rebate program has nothing to do with these
concerns of unnecessary use of prescription drugs or safeguarding
Medicaid payments."86
In addition to the legislative history, the circumstances surround
ing enactment shed insight into congressional purpose and serve to
place the statute in its appropriate legal context.87 In assessing the le
gal landscape, an important factor to consider is how prior authoriza
tion was most commonly implemented by the states immediately after
the provision was enacted in 1990. In a paper published in the early
1990s, Drs. Robert Buchanan and Scott Smith found that the "most
common method used by the Medicaid programs to enforce their poli-

prior authorization; and . . . provides for the dispensing of at least 72-hour supply of a cov
ered outpatient prescription drug in an emergency situation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r8(d)(5)(A)-(B) (West 2001).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 98 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2110
("As under current law, States would have the option of imposing prior authorization re
quirements with respect to covered prescription drugs in order to safeguard against unneces
sary utilization and assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality
of care. However, the Committee does not intend that States establish or implement prior
authorization controls that have the effect of preventing competent physicians from pre
scribing in accordance with their medical judgment."); H.R. REP. No. 101-964 Part B (1990)
("Except in the first year following approval of a new drug, States are permitted to subject
any covered outpatient drug to prior authorization. States may limit quantities of drugs, pro
vided the limitations are necessary to discourage waste.").
86. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20 n.12 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) .
87. The purposivist judge need not limit herself only to the text and legislative history in
ascertaining the statute's purpose. Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 816. The purposivist
judge must also examine the entire "legal landscape" in order to properly interpret the stat
ute in a manner consonant with the greater legal context. Id. While the text and legislative
history inform the more immediate purposes of the statute by allowing glimpses into the en
acting Congress's mind, the legal landscape involves assessing the dynamic legal, social and
political forces that change and shape the statute into one that fits into the legal system as a
whole as it develops throughout time. See HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1124 ("The pur
pose of a statute must always be treated as including not only an immediate purpose or
group of related purposes but a larger and more subtle purpose as to how the particular stat
ute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole.").
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cies against off-label use is prior authorization."88 Off-label use is the
practice of physicians prescribing approved medications for other than
their intended indications.89 Thus, interpreting the prior authorization
provision to apply only to the prevention of off-label use serves to fur
ther the statute's purpose within the existing legal landscape of the
early 1990s. Moreover, the use of prior authorization in the context of
limiting off-label prescription - a practice that can lead to unneces
sary over-prescription - fits harmoniously with the legislative his
tory.90 This legal landscape created by the states in the early 1990s
provides a greater context in ascertaining the statute's true purposes.
This contextual framework, coupled with the legislative history, sug
gests the purpose behind the prior authorization was to reduce unnec
essary and inefficient over-prescription by curbing off-label use.
Finally, proposed regulations by the HCFA, the agency that once
administered Medicaid,91 further paint a picture of the legislative land
scape in conformity with the prior state enactments and legislative his
tory. The HCFA failed to issue formal regulations regarding prior
authorization.92 Yet the proposed regulations that the HFCA promul
gated indicate that prior authorization should only be used to curb un
necessary prescription, not to limit coverage.93 As such, the proposed
regulations by the HFCA support the idea that the Maine Program
should be preempted as it conflicts with federal law.94
In light of this legislative history and legal landscape, the First
Circuit failed to recognize the intent underlying prior authorization.
The First Circuit, in assessing the Maine Rx Program, argued that the
88. Robert J. Buchanan & Scott R. Smith, Medicaid Policies for HIV-Related Prescrip
tion Drugs, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1994, at 43, 57.
89. MEDICINENET, INC., MEDTERMS DICTIONARY (2002), at http://www.medterms
.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2002); see, e.g., infra note 90.
90. An example of the use of prior authorization as a method for controlling unneces
sary prescription of off-label drugs is as follows: "state X" places minoxidil on its Medicaid
formulary for the treatment of hypertension. Doctors in "state X" begin prescribing minoxi
dil off-label in order to treat hair loss. "State X" subjects minoxidil to prior authorization in
order to curb this off-label prescription which it believes to be unnecessary and uneconom
ical in light of the allocation of funds for the most important drugs.
91. See Abigail B. Pancoast, Comment, A Test Case for Re-evaluation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause: The Maine Rx Program, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 184, 190 (2001). HCFA, as
of July 1, 2001, no longer exists. HCFA is now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv
ices. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, at http://cms.hhs.gov/about/default.asp
(last visited July 31, 2002).
92. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20 n.12 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000); Pancoast, supra
note 91 , at 190.
93. See Medicaid Program; Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs Under Drug Rebate
Agreements with Manufacturers, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,442, 48,454 (Sept. 19, 1995) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 441 and 447) (noting that states should be prevented from "using a prior
authorization program as a proxy for a closed formulary").
94. See Pancoast, supra note 91, at 190.
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Maine statute permissibly utilized prior authorization by noting that
the federal text explicitly allowed for prior authorization and that, ab
sent any textual proof to the contrary, deference must be given to the
Maine Department of Human Services' application of the provision.95
The First Circuit's decision is flawed in two respects.
First, that court used a strictly textual approach in examining the
preemption question and therefore ignored Congress's true purposes.
As noted above, the legislative history, the proposed HCFA regula
tions, and state laws established post-enactment demonstrate the nar
row intentions that Congress had for prior authorization.96 The First
Circuit, however, ignored the legal context and instead used the si
lence of the text to make the bold conclusion that it was "not con
vinced that the Medicaid statute is concerned with the motivation be
hind imposing prior authorization."97 The implication of this statement
is potentially disastrous. As the District Court below argued, "If
Maine can use its authority over Medicaid authorization to leverage
drug manufacturer rebates for the benefit of uninsured citizens, then it
can just as easily put the rebates into a state program for highway and
bridge construction or school funding."98 The First Circuit briefly, but
insufficiently, responded to this argument, noting that highway con
struction and school funding are unrelated to providing medical serv
ices and, therefore, could not be justified.99 This response is insuffi
cient because the crux of the District Court's argument deals not with
the latter part of its statement - the use of funds for highways and
schools - but the former - the use of prior authorization as a lever
age device. Because the First Circuit already indicated that the moti
vations behind prior authorization are not of concern,100 presumably a
state could implement a program as a leverage device against doctors,
or as a tool to reduce Medicaid spending at the expense of the poor, or
for any other purpose it so desired. Moreover, in addressing the latter
part of the District Court's argµment, if the First Circuit only limited
the use of the rebate monies to providing medical services to the
needy, states still could potentially leverage drug manufacturers and
use the funds not for highways but for the construction of county hos
pitals or other medically-related self-dealing. This certainly was not
the vision that Congress had for prior authorization.101

95. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001).
96. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
97. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 76.
98. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *20.
99. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77.
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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Second, the First Circuit's decision is incomplete in that it failed to
find preemption of the state statute based on the law's conflict with
Medicaid's requirement that health care be in the "best interests" of
the program.102 Prior authorization as implemented by Maine runs
contrary to the Medicaid provision that any state restriction on drug
distribution "provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure
that . . . care and services . . . will be provided, in a manner consistent
with . . . the best interests of [Medicaid] requirements."103 The Maine
Program harms Maine recipients by impeding their access to their doc
tors' first-choice medications and, therefore, runs opposite to the best
interests of providing medically necessary services to the poor. '04 The
First Circuit did not reject this argument and only ruled against
PhRMA on this point because of PhRMA's inability to sustain its bur
den on this facial challenge.105 Rather, the First Circuit voiced its con
cern in stating: "Since both sides agree that the prior authorization re
quirement is the 'hammer' or 'force' that coerces manufacturers to
enter into the Program, the possibility that first-choice drugs will not
be readily approved where second-choice inferior alternatives exist
concerns us."106 The District Court stated that the best interests of the
patient would be hurt by prior authorization and it would therefore
defeat the fundamental purposes of Medicaid law.107 There was testi
mony on the record that when prior authorization is used inappropri
ately, patients are hurt by increased delays, anxiety and confusion, and
by the potential prescription of less safe and efficacious drugs.108 Fur
thermore, although little empirical study has been done on the effects
of prior authorization, existing empirical data strongly support
PhRMA's argument.")9 Taken together, all these factors demonstrate
the high likelihood that the Maine statute's use of prior authorization
102. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 78.
103. 42 U.S.C.A. 1396c(a)(19) (West 2000).
104. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77. In addition to the obstacles in. receiving first-choice
medication, the state prior authorization statutes harm Medicaid recipients in the long run in
the form of research and development losses incurred by pharmaceutical companies. This
further compounds the state statutes' conflict with the Medicaid program's "best interests"
requirement. See infra Section Il.B.
105. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 78.
106. Id.
107. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *19-20 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000).
108. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 77-78 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Scott Howell).
109. See Walter E. Smalley et al., Effect of a Prior-Authorization Requirement on the
Use of Nonsteroidal Antiinf/ammatory Drugs by Medicaid Patients, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1612, 1614 (1995). The study examined NSAIDs that did not have a generic equivalent and
were subject to prior authorization. Id. The study found that during the two years after prior
authorization began, total expenditures for NSAIDs fell by $12.8 million compared to pro
jections. Id. In addition, the study found no evidence of an increase in other related services
and drugs. Id.
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undermines Congress's explicit purposes of safeguarding the best in
terests of the Medicaid program and its patients.11°
This Section has demonstrated that under a purposive paradigm,
with a view of the legislative history and circumstances in the states
subsequent to enactment, Congress meant prior authorization to be
used only in limited circumstances.111 The First Circuit, using a textual
approach, failed to identify the limited purposes of the prior authori
zation statute, and also failed to interpret the statute properly in order
to harmonize it with the best interest requirement which undergirds
the federal statute.112 Taking these factors into account, the Maine
Program stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the aforemen
tioned congressional purposes and therefore must be preempted.
This Section has shown that the purposive approach is superior to
the textual framework in the context of Medicaid preemption because
of the increased role of the judiciary in safeguarding the federalism
concerns inherent in the statute. Under this purposive paradigm, the
Maine Program must be preempted in light of the legislative history
and subsequent state enactment reflecting the narrow purposes found
in that legislative history. Pursuant to the congressional purposes,
prior authorization does not stand as a leverage device used to extract
rebates from pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, its misapplication
stands as an obstacle to Congress's purposes and Medicaid's best in
terest purposes.
B. A Delicate Balance Undone: The lmpermissibility
of Cost Over Access

"All interpretive theories must ultimately be grounded in a politi
cal theory and a theory of law."m The notion of a purposivist frame
work operating in a political vacuum is therefore both unrealistic and
impossible. The appropriate political theory often depends on the na
ture of the law at stake. In analyzing Medicaid, courts should adopt a
delicate balance political theory because of the nature of the Medicaid
program and because such a theory creates appropriate outer bounda
ries to the purposive paradigm. Further, under a delicate balance the
ory of law, the state prior authorization statutes must be preempted
because they effectively unravel careful compromises over cost and
access embodied in the legislation.
110. See H.R. REP. No.101-881 (1992), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.N. 2017 ("[T)he
Committee does not intend that States establish or implement prior authorization controls
that have the effect of preventing competent physicians from prescribing in accordance with
their medical judgment.").
11 1. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
1 1 2. See supra notes 101 -109 and accompanying text.
1 13. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 31.
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The delicate balance theory rests upon the idea that legislation is a
package of compromises between various groups, and states should
not be allowed to upset the political decisions made by Congress in ac
commodating competing interests and interest groups.114 The case of
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette115 illustrates this theory. The Court
in Ouellette first noted that a "state law also is pre-empted if it inter
feres with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to
reach this goal."116 The Clean Water Act, the law at issue in Ouellette,
carefully balanced public and private interests in attempting to elimi
nate water pollution.117 The Court held that the Vermont law allowing
common-law suits would upset this carefully crafted balance of inter
ests at the federal level and therefore must be preempted.118 Thus, the
Court recognized the balanced nature of the statute and deferred ac
cordingly to that balance.
Three reasons demonstrate why this political theory is so attractive
in the present case. First, Medicaid, much like the Clean Water Act, is
a program that balances interests of different groups - doctors, re
cipients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers - and balances compet
ing goals - accessibility and cost-effectiveness.119 For exampl�, the
fe deral rebate requirement serves as a quid pro quo to balance the
pharmaceutical manufacturers' open access to state formularies, i.e.,
states' lists of covered drugs - an arrangement that protects and pre
serves the interests of manufacturers, patients, and both federal and

114. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 69, 77-79 (1988).
115. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). For other examples of delicate balance theory, see City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 169 (1963) (White, J., dissenting); Paul W. Kahn, The
Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97
YALE L.J. 1 (1987). For an example of the theory in the food and drug setting, see Schering
Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 51 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1995).
116. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494.
117. Id. at 494.
118. Id. at 497 ("The CWA carefully defines the role of both the source and affected
States, and specifically provides for a process whereby their interests will be considered and
balanced by the source State and the EPA. This delineation of authority represents Con
gress' considered judgment as to the best method of serving the public interest and recon
ciling the often-competing concerns of those affected by the 'pollution. It would be extraor
dinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to
tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to undermine this regulatory structure.").
119. See generally GILMAN, supra note 65 (discussing the twin goals of (:Ontrolling ex
penditures and providing the best care); MEDICAID REFORM AND THE AMERICAN STATES
(Mark R. Daniels ed., 1998) (same); REMAKING MEDICAID: MANAGED CARE FOR THE
PUBLIC GOOD, at xiv (Stephen M. Davidson & Stephen A. Somers eds., 1998) (same). For a
description of the competing interests inherent in Medicaid's comparable sister program,
Medicare, see Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1987).
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state governments.120 Medicaid epitomizes the delicate balance theory
of legislation.
Second, delicate balance theory guides courts in dealing with diffi
cult issues of federalism in an area of complex federal/state relations.
For example, in the case of Medicaid, the political history of the pro
gram demonstrates the federal government's controlling position vis
a-vis the states, thereby providing courts with the clear message that
the federal balance of interests should be upheld.121 In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the federal government began to exert greater control
in Medicaid and treat the states not as co-equals, but as subordinates
to be commanded.122 In describing the Medicaid program as an exam
ple of this new change in federal/state relations, one scholar notes:
"Instead of relying upon the carrot of federal grants and conditions-of
aid to gain state cooperation, the federal government has relied in
creasingly upon sticks of various sorts, including legislative regulation,
preemption, and judicial decrees."123 Even when Congress did give
discretion to the states during this time, it did so in many cases with
instructions of great specificity.124 If Congress demanded to be in the
driver's seat in the promulgation of Medicaid requirements, then pre
sumably it would also not want those provisions reflecting a delicate
balance to be subverted by the states. Deference to federal interests
via the delicate balance theory therefore recognizes Congress's intent
to retain greater control in the realm of Medicaid.
Third, the delicate balance theory provides outer limits to protect
against judicial lawmaking. The theory is based on the idea of law that
the legislature forms legislation as a package of compromises and that
the judiciary cannot interfere to destroy the package.125 Thus, the deli
cate balance theory used in conjunction with purposivism serves as a
balance within the jurisprudence. The purposivist judge proactively
searches for statutory intent, yet the limits of the delicate balance
theory prevent excessive judicial overreaching and the destruction of
legislative will.126 The p.urposivist court looks to the purposes of the
law, and if it sees legislation that seems to be indicative of a delicate
balance, then it defers to that balance. Therefore, a delicate balance
120. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief at para. 1 7, Pharm.
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows (N.D. Fla. 2001 ) (4:01CV356-ws).
1 21. GILMAN, supra note 65, at 105.
1 22. Id.
1 23.

Id.

1 24.

Id.

at 1 1 5.

125. Wolfson, supra note 114, at 77.
1 26. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 27 (noting that the objective of archeological mod
els of interpretation is legislative supremacy); Jordan, supra note 39, at 1216-17 (recognizing
that purposivism, as well as textualism, is wholly committed to the idea of legislative su
premacy).
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theory may provide sound guidance for the purposivist judge who
seeks to fulfill her role in safeguarding federalism while stopping short
of legislating from the bench. Thus, the nature of the Medicaid pro
gram, the creation of outer limits to prevent against judicial lawmak
ing, and a recognition of Congress's purposeful superiority over the
states in Medicaid all support the utilization of a delicate balance the
ory in assessing a Medicaid preemption conflict.
Some opponents of the delicate balance theory, however, argue
that it overlooks the fundamental premise of federalism that holds
that there are two levels of legislative activity: federal and state.127
These critics continue by noting that a delicate balance theory does
not necessarily evince an intent by Congress to preclude the states
from altering the balance at their legislative level.128 If states were pre
cluded from acting, the opponents argue, then "there would seem to
be little if any room for state regulatory authority."129 The slippery
slope is wet with the fear that the delicate balance theory may lead to
the extreme centralization of government. Although a valid concern in
the field of Medicaid, there are two responses to this contention.
First, the delicate balance theory would only preclude states from
acting and upsetting federal interests where the legislation
demonstrates a multi-interest, compromise nature. If states were
allowed to subvert the balance in these types of laws, then there would
be no reason for Congress to strike the balance in the first place.130
One could easily envision Congress washing its hands of formulating
any legislation that involved a complex network of interests. Programs
like Medicaid and the Clean Water Act would be subject to a patch
work of varying state visions, and the uniformity found within these
programs would be lost.
In addition, the theory would only amount to "minifield" preemp
tion where Congress marks out a small part of a piece of legislation
that represents a delicate balance and cannot be upset.131 For example,
a court could conclude in the case of Medicaid that the provisions re
lating to rebates and prior authorization132 represent a minifield that
Congress completely occupies due to the balance of interests fo und in
those subsections. Thus the states would be preempted from entering
that field and changing those provisions. States would not be pre
cluded from the whole field of Medicaid and the delicate balance con-

127. Wolfson, supra note 1 14, at 81-82.
128. Id.
129. KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE
APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 36 (1991).
130. Wolfson, supra note 114, at 82.
131. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C.A.§§ 1396r-8(c)-(d) {West 2000) .
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sequently would work hand-in-hand with the management of federal
ism.
In applying the delicate balance theory to the state prior authoriza
tion statutes at issue, it becomes clear that the state laws upset the bal
ance struck by Congress between accessibility of drugs provided by
pharmaceutical manufacturers and cost-effectiveness realized by the
states. By linking prior authorization to extracting supplemental re
bates from pharmaceutical companies, states impermissibly decrease
access to drugs and subvert the balance between access and expense
mandated to the states in 1990. The mandatory rebates in the Medi
caid statute were originally part of private voluntary pharmaceutical
programs between pharmaceutical manufacturers and states.133 After
many, but not all, states adopted the private program, Congress man
dated in its Medicaid legislation that all fifty states adopt this program
and thereby increase access to medicines through these rebates.134
Congress's incorporation of an originally voluntary state program into
its federal law as a required program makes one thing clear: the
method of rebating in order to improve access to prescription drugs is
not optional.
When states leverage supplemental rebates out of drug companies
by utilizing the threat of prior authorization, these states effectively
turn a congressional mandate into something entirely discretionary.
States could require exorbitant supplemental rebate amounts for cer
tain drugs in order to limit access purposefully through the deterrent
of prior authorization and thereby cut costs. The delicate balance be
tween cost and access, consequently, would be destroyed. In order to
maintain the delicate balance of interests in the federal legislation, the
state prior authorization statutes must be preempted as running con
trary to the purpose of Congress in tempering cost and open access to
necessary prescription drugs for the poor.
Medicaid embodies a delicate balance of interests, and the state
prior authorization statutes must be preempted in order to preserve
that balance. As the First Circuit noted, "federal preemption of a state
law is strong medicine, and is not casually to be dispensed."135 Al
though the medicine is strong, it is clearly warranted in the present
case. By using a purposive interpretive paradigm that is founded upon
a delicate balance political theory, these state statutes must be deemed
to be in implied conflict with Congress's purposes, and consequently
preempted. Maine and several other states turned the rebate and prior
authorization provisions in the federal law on their head. Congress,
133. R. Roy Vagelos, Are Prescription Drug Prices High?, 252 SCIENCE, 1080, 1083-1084
(1991) (describing Merck's "Equal Access to Medicines Program").
134. 42 U .S C.A § 1396r-8(a)-(c) (West 2000) ; see Vagelos, supra note 133, at 1084.
.

.

135. Concannon, supra note 15, at 75 (internal quotations omitted).

November 2002]

Medicaid

625

however, never intended prior authorization to be used as a bargain
ing device to subvert the balanced interests in the legislation.
II. A SLEEPING GIANT AWAKENS: THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION
STATUTES
Resolution of the preemption question does not foreclose the con
stitutional dilemma associated with prior authorization. Although pre
emption remains dispositive, alternative grounds of attack remain in
the form of the dormant commerce clause. A court managing to
squirm around the preemptive qualities of the prior authorization
statutes must still cross through the constitutional quagmire of the
dormant commerce clause. This Part argues that such a task is impos
sible because the state statutes clearly run afoul of the dormant com
merce clause. Section II.A paves the way for the dormant commerce
clause analysis by dismissing market participation as a viable defense
for a state seeking refuge from a barrage of Commerce Clause attacks.
Section II.B proceeds to argue that the state prior authorization stat
utes are per se unconstitutional because they have an extraterritorial
reach. Section II.C then argues in the alternative that even if the stat
utes are upheld under an extraterritoriality test, they must be struck
down under a balancing test since the burdens on interstate commerce
outweigh the local benefits of the statutes.
A. A Word on Market Participation: The Easy Case
If a state is acting as a participant in the market and not as a regu
lator, it may discriminate against out-of-state interests and be free
from the constraints of the dormant commerce clause.136 The distinc
tion between a regulator and a participant is often unclear;137 never
theless, it is imperative to understand those differences in the present
case to fully address the salient dormant commerce clause attacks. The
case of the state prior authorization statutes, however, is an easy one.
With regard to these statutes, the distinction is clear: the states' regula
tion of drug prices through rebate provisions is an act of market regu
lation and not market participation. Therefore, the states are not ex
empt from dormant commerce clause violation.
Both the District Court of Maine's and the First Circuit's analysis
on this point is instructive. Both courts held that under the Maine
statute, Maine was acting as a market regulator. The market partici-

136. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 336 (1997).
,

137. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 337-38.
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pant doctrine governs the specific transaction.138 Under the Maine
Program, it is the citizen who transacts and is considered the "payor"
for the pharmaceuticals - the state of Maine never buys the prescrip
tion drugs.139 The state is merely using its regulatory power in order to
achieve the specific social goal of price reduction for its citizens.140 This
is market regulation and not participation.141 Consequently, any de
fense a state may raise through the invocation of the market partici
pant doctrine must necessarily fail. The state prior authorization stat
utes - Maine's being most illustrative - are a clear exercise of states'
regulatory power. The dormant commerce clause's restrictions still
apply and therefore extraterritoriality and balancing must still be ad
dressed in turn.
B.

Extraterritoriality and the Prohibition Against Legislative
Projection

"For the most part, states may not legislate extraterritorially,
whatever exactly that means."142 This purposefully ambiguous state
ment, according to Professor Donald Regan, defines the principle of
extraterritoriality.143 The opaque gloss of Regan's definition perhaps
most vividly reflects the confusion both in the constitutional grounding
of the principle and its line of jurisprudence.144 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has considered extraterritoriality a subject of dormant

138. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 00157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *11 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) .
139. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 80 (1st Cir. 2001).
140. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *11.
141. In fact, Maine looked into becoming a bulk purchaser of pharmaceuticals, but de
cided against it presumably due to budgetary constraints. See OFFICE OF POLICY AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM'N TO STUDY BULK PURCHASING FOR
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE JOINT STANDING COMM. ON
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 199th Leg. 1st Sess., at 3, 19 (Me. 1999); Whitney M.
Phelps, Comment, Maine's Prescription Drug Plan, A Look into The Controversy, 65 ALB.
L. REV. 243, 260 (2001). Thus, Maine's consideration of bulk purchasing is telling insofa r as
it demonstrates the conscious decision of the state to forgo participation in favor of regula
tion.
142. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (ll) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1865, 1896 (1987) [hereinafter Regan, Siamese Essays].
143. Id.
1 44. The confusion abounds: whether or not extraterritoriality is a subject of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, see Regan, supra note 42, at 1280; Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note
142, at 1894, whether or not balancing and extraterritoriality are mutually exclusive, see
Edgar v. MITE Corp. , 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982); supra note 44 (listing cases), and whether
or not extraterritoriality is grounded in due process, see, e.g., Robert H. Abrams & Paul R.
Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control ofCourt Jurisdiction, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 75, 76-83 {1984).
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commerce clause jurisprudence145 and has declared that a state may
not regulate commerce "that takes place wholly outside of the State's
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."146
Thus, if a state projects its own legislation onto the regulatory schemes
of other states, the statute is extraterritorial and per se unconstitu
tional.147
The principle of extraterritoriality comes to the forefront in the is
sue of state prior authorization statutes. PhRMA argued and lost its
extraterritorial challenge to the Maine Program before the First
Circuit.148 Under closer inspection of the First Circuit's analysis, how
ever, the court misapplied the principles of extraterritorialism. This
Section critically examines the First Circuit's opinion and concludes
that the Maine Program is unconstitutional under an extraterritorial
Commerce Clause query. This Section begins by advancing the princi
pal argument that the Maine Program impermissibly regulates conduct
between pharmaceutical manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers.
Once the foundational argument is established, this Section then rec
ognizes three justifications for upholding the Maine Program on extra
territorial grounds and in turn refutes each of these justifications as
being a misapplication of constitutional principles.
The state prior authorization statutes are unconstitutionally extra
territorial because they regulate transactions that occur between out
of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. The state of
Maine houses no drug manufacturers.149 Similarly, the vast majority of
wholesalers - with only three exceptions - are located out-of
state.150 The Maine Program, by "forcing" rebates upon manufacturers
through the threat of prior authorization, in effect regulates the prices
that these complying manufacturers charge their out-of-state whole145. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86-88 (1987). But see Regan,
supra note 42, at 1280 (arguing that the extraterritorial principle is not a Commerce Clause
principle).
146. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-43.
147. ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174 (1997) (stating that a state cannot enact "leg
islation that has the practical effect of exporting that state's domestic policies").
148. Pharrn. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Because the regulation only applies to in-state activities, there is no extraterritorial reach
and the Act is not per se invalid under the Commerce Clause.").
149. Pharrn. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv., No. 001 57-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *13 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000).
150. Id. at *5-6. ("There are limited exceptions. Hannaford Bros. Co., located in Maine,
buys directly from Roxane Laboratories, Inc. and Boehringer Ingleheim Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.; Bindley Western Drug Company, a distributor, has a subsidiary, J.E. Goold, that is lo
cated in Maine; and Progressive Distributors, . Inc., another distributor, has a facility in
Maine . . . . Under the contracts with these companies, however, the sale from the manufac
turer always occurs at the place of business outside Maine - with the exception of
Hannaford Bros. Co. In other words, Bindley Western and Progressive Distributors go to
other states to buy their products, then import them into Maine.").
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sale buyers.151 As the District Court declared, "Maine may have power
over what pharmacists later do here in Maine, or over the few distribu
tors who transact business in Maine, but it has no power to regulate
the prices paid earlier in transactions in other states."152 The "practical
effect"153 of the rebate is clear: manufacturers must sell their drugs at
lower prices to wholesalers in order for those wholesalers to sell the
prescription drugs in Maine at the rebated price level.154 Because these
wholesalers and manufacturers all reside outside of Maine's borders,
the Maine Program is entirely extraterritorial in its reach and there
fore unconstitutional.155
Three major counter-arguments, however, can be raised in an at
tempt to uphold the statute on extraterritorial grounds. First, the
Maine Program constitutionally regulates extraterritorial conduct be
cause it does so by indirect means. Second, one can distinguish the
primary extraterritorial cases as dealing with price control statutes,
whereas the Maine Program is not a price control. Third, the rebate
agreement in the Maine Program is voluntary and therefore the manu
facturers are free to not participate and not be bound extraterritoriar
ally. The First Circuit upheld the statute on extraterritorial grounds
under these three justifications.156 Although all valid arguments, they
are ultimately unpersuasive and will be refuted in tum.
First, the First Circuit argued that an indirect regulation of out-of
state transactions does not violate the constitutional principle of extra
territoriality. The First Circuit upheld the Maine Program because the
Maine Program regulated out-of-state transactions in an indirect man
ner. The court stated: "[T]he Maine Act does not impose direct con151. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 78 ("[T]he prior authorization requirement is the 'hammer'
or 'force' that coerces manufacturers to enter into the Program . . . . ).
"

152. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17363, at *14.
153. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1 989) (stating that a "state law that has the
'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is in
valid under the Commerce Clause").
154. This practical effect becomes more apparent given the fact that the rebate prices
are below the pre-rebate wholesale prices, and thus manufacturers necessarily lose profits
due to the adjustment of wholesale prices. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (dis
cussing Maine's coercive tactics leading to lost profits).
155. The extraterritorial reach of the statute only applies to those transactions between
out-of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. Therefore, Maine still can constitu
tionally regulate the limited number of transactions that involve one or more of the state's
few wholesalers. Of course, Part I of this Note argues that such regulations would be invali
dated on preemption grounds.
If Maine had any in-state manufacturers, the analysis potentially becomes a bit more
complex. The physical location of the transaction - whether the sale occurred in the state of
Maine or out-of-state - would determine constitutionality under the dormant commerce
clause. The complexity arises in determining the exact location of transaction. See CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at
1 874.
156. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81-82.
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trols on a transaction that occurs wholly out-of-state."157 The di
rect/indirect rule states that a direct regulation is generally held to be
per se unconstitutional whereas an indirect regulation is subject to a
lower level of scrutiny via a balancing test. 158 Because the Maine Pro
gram only regulates the out-of-state transactions between manufactur
ers and wholesalers indirectly via the rebate provision, the law is not
per se invalid. Although this probably was the First Circuit's strongest
ground for upholding the statute, two arguments refute the primacy of
the indirect/direct distinction.
Indirectness is not dispositive of extraterritorial scrutiny as it is
only one of three major principles that govern extraterritorial analy
sis.159 Only the second principle - "a statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State . . . is in
valid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was in
tended by the legislature"160 - makes reference to a direct control.
The second principle also seems mostly to address motive review and
the fact that a direct control would be subject to strict scrutiny even if
legislative motive was pure. Furthermore, the first principle dealing
with price scales (and not mentioning directness) seems most relevant
to the Maine rebate statute at hand. Directness maintains a small
place in the jurisprudence, but its primacy over the other principles
and its use as a criterion for heightened scrutiny is unclear.161 From the
explication of the other principles making no reference to directness,
the inference is drawn that the strict scrutiny of extraterritorially does
not depend upon the directness of the regulation, and alternative
grounds exist to justify an indirect regulation.
Additionally, any direct/indirect test is mechanical and often re
sults in inconsequential and arbitrary results.162 The key in extraterri157. Id. at 82.
158. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986).
159. As the Court in Healy posited, the extraterritorial cases stand for three principles:
"First, the Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside the State's borders . . . specifically, a State may not adopt
legislation that has the practical effect of establishing a scale of prices for use in other
states . . . . Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State . . . is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach
was intended by the legislature . . . . Third, the practical effect of the statute must be evalu
ated . . . by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the regulatory regimes
of other States . . . ." Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (internal citations omit
ted).
160. Id.
161. See Daniel M. Forman, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Massa
chusetts Landfill Moratorium: Are National Market Principles Adequately Served?, 24 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 425, 435 (1997).
162. Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735,
1737-38 (1988).

630

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:602

torial cases is the fact that the state is projecting its regulatory scheme
onto transactions outside of its boundaries. The direct/indirect distinc
tion misses the point. In the case of the Maine Program, Maine does
not deny that the practical effect of the statute is to reduce the prices
of the drugs that out-of-state manufacturers sell to out-of-state dis
tributors. The means of doing this - whether through direct regula
tion of that transaction or through an indirect rebate affecting the
eventual prices of the Medicaid drugs sold in Maine - are irrelevant.
The means are irrelevant because the state will reach its end regard
less of the directness of . the means.163 In fact, subverting principles of
state interest for a mechanical directness test may undermine the very
ideals of state sovereignty that extraterritorialism seeks to protect.164
The bottom line of extraterritorialism is not directness, but practical
effects. As the Supreme Court has reasoned, "the critical considera
tion in determining whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute vio
lates the Commerce Clause is the overall effect of the statute on both
local and interstate commerce."165 The effects of a statute on state sov
ereignty and national economy166 must have primacy over the me
chanics and perversities of directness.
The second major justification for upholding the Maine Program is
that the case law governing extraterritoriality deals with the impermis
sibility of price controls and price affirmations.167 The First Circuit jus
tified the statute by distinguishing the three cases that PhRMA relied
upon168 as being cases about price affirmation and control and there
fore unrelated to the Maine statute which "does not regulate the price
of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its in
evitable effect."169 As opposed to the price control cases, Maine does
not fix the prices of goods sold out-of-state and therefore does not af
fect the commerce of its sister states.170
The problem with the First Circuit's treatment of the cases cited by
PhRMA is that the distinction that the court drew is irrelevant. The
First Circuit stressed that the Maine Program does not regulate the

163. Id. at 1737.
164. Id. at 1740.
165. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989).
166. Id. at 335-36 (recognizing the special concerns governing extraterritoriality of na
tional economic union and state autonomy).
167. For an excellent discussion of the economics of price controls, see JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, A THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL (1980).
168. PhRMA relied upon Healy, 491 U.S. at 324, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New
York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), and Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511
(1935).
169. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 81 (1st Cir. 2001).
170. See Phelps, supra note 141, at 265.
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sale of drugs by manufacturers to wholesalers at a certain price.171 The
crux of the argument is that in the case of explicit price affirmation
and price controls, prices are pre-determined either at a fixed amount
or against a fixed benchmark. This is not the case with regard to the
Maine Program. Nonetheless, the First Circuit never elaborated why
such a distinction is relevant, or why the price needs to be bench
marked to a specific price in order to be extraterritorial.
In fact, the Maine rebate operates exactly as a price control. For
example, if a manufacturer agrees to rebate its drug by ten percent,
the inevitable effect is a ten percent reduction in the price paid to the
manufacturer by the out-of-state wholesaler .given the reasonable as
sumption that the wholesaler wants to maintain its profit margin.172
The First Circuit noted that the Maine law, unlike the affirmation and
control statutes, does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of
state prices.173 But that is exactly what the statute does - it makes out
of-state prices dependent on the in-state rebated sales. The First
Circuit began its analysis by stating that the Maine Program does not
regulate prices "either by its express terms or by its inevitable
effect. "174 Yet the court glossed over the fact that the Maine Program,
in effect, is a price control. Thus, its treatment of the price affirmation
and control cases vis-a-vis the Maine Program was misguided.
The third major justification for upholding the statute deals with
the voluntary and non-mutual nature of the rebate agreement. The
First Circuit disposed of the extraterritorial challenge .on the grounds
that the rebate agreement is voluntary and a decision to be bound by it
is made freely by the manufacturer.175 The court went on to note that a
manufacturer's choice to engage in the rebates and lose profits is not
an extraterritorial regulation of profits, but rather a decision made by
the manufacturer itself.176 The court did, however, recognize that the
manufacturer's freedom of choice may become coercive depending
upon the negotiation tactics used by the commissioner in extracting

171. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81-82.
172. In other words, regulation of the final price in the sale by the wholesaler to the re
tailer/recipients (a rebate under the Maine Program) will affect the price in the prior transac
tion between manufacturer and wholesaler given the assumption that the wholesaler seeks to
maintain present profit margin. In this way there is a relationship between both transactions.
See generally RONALD S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COOPTATION: NETWORKS OF
MARKET CONSTRAINTS AND DIRECTORATE TIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 9 (1983)
(describing the relational patterns and interdependencies of transactions and pricing in the
market).
173. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 82.
174. Id. at 81.
175. Id. at 82 ("The rebate program is voluntary and either the manufacturer or the
State may withdraw at any time with sixty days' notice.").
176. Id.
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rebates and therefore the issue could be revisited subsequent to im
plementation.177
This "voluntary rationale" once again is a misapplication of consti
tutional principle. Whether the choice to be bound to the statute is en
tirely voluntary is not of consequence in assessing extraterritoriality.
The freedom of choice or lack thereof to be bound by extraterritorial
legislation does not in itself provide independent grounds for the con
ferral of extraterritorial jurisdiction.178 Thus, something is impermissi
bly extraterritorial regardless of the mutuality of the party of con
cern.179 The First Circuit failed to realize this point.180
In addition, the First Circuit's voluntary rationale - specifically its
language concerning the voluntary aspects of a manufacturer's deci
sion to forgo profits - is both overly formalistic and arbitrary. First,
the court stated that the Maine law in no way regulated profits and
that such a decision was strictly based on the manufacturer's own voli
tion.181 This argument is overly formalistic in that it fails to take into
account the effect of the rebate - the reduction of the manufacturer's
profit margin. The court, in this same vein of formalism, attempted to
justify its position by stating that the statutory language calls for "ne
gotiating rebates" and not "regulating prices."182 The statute does in
fact regulate profits, but it does so indirectly through the mechanism
of the rebate.
Second, the court's discussion of the regulation of profits reflects
an arbitrariness and a possible prejudice that drives the entire opinion.

177. Id.
178. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1903. Professor Regan's discussion of
Brown-Forman is instructive. lei. In Brown-Forman, the distiller cooperated in the creation
of the New York law to be bound extraterritorially and affirm a set price as a quid pro quo
for being able to do business in New York. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1986). The distiller, much like the drug manu
facturer in the present instance, remained "free" to abide by the price cap or simply to do no
business in New York. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1903. Regan compares
Brown-Forman to the hypothetical of "Jones," an Illinois resident, who irrationally swears
out an affidavit to be bound extraterritorially by Georgia's sodomy law; commits sodomy in
Illinois in violation of the Georgia law; and then travels to Georgia. Id. at 1904. Georgia
would not be able to prosecute Jones for something he did in Illinois. Id. Regan, comparing
"Jones" and Brown-Forman, reaches the quite logical conclusion that "[i]f a free undertak
ing to be bound by extraterritorial legislation, whether by Jones or by a distiller, does not
confer extraterritorial jurisdiction, then it seems even clearer that the distiller's actual af
firmation, which was to some degree compelled by the New York licensing agreements,
should not grant extraterritorial jurisdiction." Id.
179. Presumably this would also render the First Circuit's concern for coercion by the
state commissioner moot. If a law is extraterritorial regardless of the free choice of the chal
lenging party, then the presence or absence of coercive tactics in no way changes the fact of
its extraterritoriality.
180. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2001).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The court noted that the Commissioner's negotiation may become co
ercive, and at that point in time, a challenge should be brought.183 Yet
the court never addressed exactly at what point in time negotiation
would equal coercion. The court's failure to set an objective standard
of fairness to measure the level of coercion is potential for an arbitrary
normative judgment.
The First Circuit's analysis in its totality perhaps reflects that such
a standard of fairness will be biased against the pharmaceutical manu
facturers.184 The court initially glossed over the "inevitable effect"
principle of the extraterritorial inquiry most likely because it consid
ered a loss of profits as being a voluntary action completely unrelated
to the rebates.185 The court then created a formalistic and counter
intuitive distinction between "negotiating rebates" and "regulating
profits."186 Finally, the court declared that, at the nebulous point of co
ercion, the issue of extraterritoriality may be reconsidered again; yet,
the court never articulated what constitutes such a breaking point.187
These aspects of the opinion taken together lead to the inference of a
possible prejudice that- the court may have held against pharmaceuti
cal companies and the perception that such companies make excessive
and unwarranted profits.
The Maine Program extraterritorially projects its regulation onto
out-of-state transactions. Such a practice runs afoul of fundamental
dormant commerce clause values. The First Circuit attempted to vali
date the statute in light of its apparent deficiency · by distinguishing
away the relevant price control cases, focusing upon the voluntariness
of the statute, and utilizing the indirectness of the regulation as its
savings clause. The First Circuit's analysis, however, was misguided.
The statute is extraterritorial and per se unconstitutional.
C.

Medicaid in the Balance: An Examination ofBurdens and
Benefits

The present dormant commerce clause inquiry should begii:i and
end with extraterritoriality. Nevertheless, for the unpersuaded court
that upholds the prior authorization statutes under an extraterritorial
ity analysis, a lower level of scrutiny will still suffice to demonstrate a

183. Id.
184. The First Circuit's prejudice becomes even more apparent in the context of its balancing test analysis. See infra notes 237-254 and accompanying text.
185. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2001).
186. Id.

187. See id.
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Commerce Clause violation in the present case.188 Traditionally, a
court refusing an extraterritorial challenge applies a balancing test to
the statute at hand.189 Under the balancing test, the statute will be up
held "unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."190 In the present
case, even under the lower level of scrutiny of the balancing test, the
state statutes impose burdens on commerce that outweigh their bene
fits and are therefore unconstitutional. By first evaluating the per
ceived benefits of lower prescription drug prices for Medicaid recipi
ents, such benefits become exposed as de minimus. Moreover,
understanding that courts must weigh in the balance the loss of profits
incurred by pharmaceutical manufacturers imposes a significant bur
den on interstate commerce. Finally, under a Carotene Products analy
sis,191 the balance must tip in favor of PhRMA because of its potential
characterization as a group discriminated against in the political proc
ess.
The benefit of lower prices to Medicaid recipients through the
supplemental state rebates is small and should be given little weight in
the balance. The First Circuit considered lower prices of prescription
drugs and the consequent increased access to prescription drugs by the
poor a "substantial" benefit.192 Two primary reasons cut against the
value of lower prices as a putative local benefit. First, prescription
drugs account for only ten percent of Medicaid spending.193 Thus, tar
geting prescription drugs really will not provide substantial benefits
relative to Medicaid spending in total.194 The degree of the benefit is

1 88. Because state prior authorization statutes clearly do not discriminate facially
against out-of-staters, a balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, applies. See Concannon,
249 F.3d at 83; Phelps, supra note 1 41 , at 262.
189. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
190. Id. The language "clearly excessive" implies more than a mere mathematical for
mula, but rather a legal standard conditional on degree. See id. ("If a legitimate local pur
pose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.").
191. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
192. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 84.
193. Regional Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3385796.
194. Jonathan L. Mezrich, International Tax Issues of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,
10 AKRON TAX J. 127, 135 n.29 (1993) ("Curiously, many Congressmen fail to appreciate the
relative insignificance of pharmaceuticals to health care costs . . . .While a 10% cost (if accu
rate) is a little more significant, it is still a small puddle in the pond."). It should be noted
that, although only ten percent of Medicaid spending, pharmaceutical costs still account for a
considerable amount of money. See Regional Report, supra note 193 ("Collectively states
spent $21 billion on drugs in the outpatient and managed-care portions of their Medicaid
programs [in 2000]."). Yet, to reiterate, $21 billion is but a small puddle in the pond of a pro
gram with gigantic total expenditures. See Leighton Ku & Jocelyn Guyer, Medicaid Spend
ing: Rising Again, Biil Not to Crisis Levels, Apr. 20, 2001, at http://www.cbpp.org ("Estimates
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small if one examines the small place of prescription drugs in the gi
gantic landscape of Medicaid.
Second, the benefits of lower prices for the poor in the short-run
may be a burden to these recipients and to consumers at large in the
long-run. The current federal rebate program is structured to make
sure manufacturers sell their Medicaid drugs at a minimum of 15.1 %
off of the manufacturer's average price - with many of the discounts
exceeding the 15.1 % level.195 This ensures that the manufacturers are
not overcharging, but rather selling at below-market prices.196 Working
under this assumption that drug companies are selling their products
to Medicaid recipients at below-market levels already, by further in
creasing that discount via state supplemental rebates, drug companies
will have greater incentive to both decrease sales197 to Medicaid recipi
ents and slow research and development of life-saving pipeline
drugs.198 Thus, the price benefit to Medicaid recipients today may pre
vent them from obtaining the necessary medications of tomorrow. In
this light, the substantial benefit of lower drug prices loses its value.
Proponents of state statutes like the Maine's contend that lower
prices will be off-set by volume increases and thus the effects on re
search and development are exaggerated and illusory. As a Merrill
that CBO issued in 1993 projected that the federal government and the states together
would spend $1.6 trillion on Medicaid from 1994 to 2000.").
195. Statement of Eli Lilly Spokesperson Gerianne Hap, Aug. 8, 2001 (on file with
author); see also, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1396r-8(c) (West 2000).
196. Pharm. Research & Mfgs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2001 )
(indicating that the rationale for the federal rebate i s one o f cost-reduction and the preven
tion of above-market prices charged by manufacturers).
197. A reduction in pharmaceutical sales has a wide-spread adverse effect on both gov
ernment health care costs as well as costs to consumers. See Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Per
spective on Pharmaceuticals: A Health-Care Scapegoat Responds; Blaming Drug Companies
For All Our Ills Harms Research and Ignores the Cost-effectiveness of the Industry, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at B7; Mezrich, supra note 194, at 135 n.30 (quoting Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association President Testifies on International
Competitiveness, TAX ANALYSTS TAX NOTES INT'L, July 24, 1991) ("Medicines not only
save lives - they save money. Medicines are the most cost-effective form of medical therapy
because they help to reduce the cost of alternative, more expensive forms of medical care,
such as surgery or hospitalization."); Mezrich, supra note 194, at 135 ("[H)igh pharmaceuti
cal costs still actually save money, because a good medicine tends to keep patients out of
hospitals or eliminate the need for surgery or other therapies which may cost much more
than even the most expensive drug.").
198. See John E. Calfee, Why Pharmaceutical Price Controls Are Bad for Patients,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE: ON THE ISSUES, Mar. 1999, available at
http://www.aei.org/oti/oti10198.htm ("But prices reflect other costs as well, in particular, the
costs of research and advertising. Fixing prices at lower levels would inevitably curtail devel
opment and distribution of new products that improve and extend life."); Peter Ferrera,
Poor Prescriptions for Health Prospects, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at A20, available at
2002 WL 2916888 (noting that price controls and other market interventions delay research
and limit access to new drugs and therapies); Leigh Page, Maine Poised to Set Nation's First
Price Controls on Drugs, Amednews.com, May 8, 2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci
pubs/amnews/pick_OO/bisc0508.html ("Many doctors worry that clamping down on drug
prices will cut back on funding for pharmaceutical research and development . . . . ).
"
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Lynch report indicated, "Volume increases could overwhelm negative
pricing impact . . . . On a worst-case basis we believe the top-line im
pact could be negative 6 percent if all Medicare recipients had access
to drugs at a 40 percent discount to the manufacturer's price.m99 At
only a negative six percent clip, drug manufacturers would not have to
dip into their research and development funds in order to finance re
bated sales.200
This argument, although reassuring in part, fails to recognize that
the drug industry is a risky, long-term business. Volume increases on
existing drugs may keep the industry alive, but continuous annual loss
projections must be accounted for now and affect the development of
drugs that could potentially reach market years from now.201 By limit
ing profits of the successful drugs, research and development will nec
essarily decline.202 The limitation by state rebate statutes, of course, is
added to the already 15.1 % minimum federal rebate to create an un
manageable obstacle to research and development.203 One health care
199. Derrick Z. Jackson, Drug Price Cuts Won't Kill Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22,
2000 available at http://www.commondreams.org/views/092300-101.htm (quoting Merril
Lynch Report, June 23, 1 999); see also Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lessons for the United
States From Foreign Price Controls on Pharmaceuticals, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 151-152
(2000) ("[T]he question remains whether Congress should impose those price controls. Con
sumers would enjoy the immediate benefit of reduced prices while pharmaceutical firms
would suffer similar reduced profit margins, although sales volume may increase.").
,

200. See Jackson, supra note 199.
201. C. Daniel Mullins et al., The Impact ofPipeline Drugs on Pharmaceutical Spending,
CENTER ON DRUGS AND PUBLIC POLICY, U. MD. SCHOOL OF PHARMACY, Apr. 13-14,
2000 at http://membership.hiaa.org/pdfs/drugsymposium.pdf (noting that consideration of
pipeline drugs is imperative for understanding and projecting future drug trends and pric
ing).
,

202. JAMES FROGUE, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WHY PRICE CONTROLS ON
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS WOULD HARM SENIORS, Executive Memorandum, May 14, 1999,
available at http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em595.html; HENRY GRABOWSKI,
HEALTH REFORM AND PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 19 (1994) (noting that research is
funded by profits from current sales of those drugs already in the marketplace); Julio
Nogues, Patents and Pharmace11tical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing
Countries, 502 World Bank WPS Paper 18 (Sept. 1990) (indicating that in the United States
the pharmaceutical industry invests between 16% and 20.8% of its revenue in research and
development); Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (Phrma), at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/industry/pro-file00/chap8nf.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2000) (same); see also
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Research, Promotion and Profits: Spotlight is on the Drug Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at 1 ("Drug companies undertake these massive searches know
ing there will be a big payoff if they hit a winner. . . . We can have lower drug prices if we
accept less of that searching. That's the choice we face.").
203. The obstacle is unmanageable in spite of claims that pharmaceutical profits are ex
cessive and can thus overcome price control. See Michael B. Moore, "Open Wide" (Your
Pocketbook That Isl) - A Call For The Establishment In The United States Of A Prescrip
tion Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1 S.w. J. L. & TRADE AM. 149, 149 n.2 (1994) (citing
EARNING A FAILING GRADE: A REPORT CARD ON 1992 DRUG MANUFACTURER PRICE
INFLATION, STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 3
(Comm. Print 1993)). In fact, due to the large fixed sunk costs incurred by pharmaceutical
manufacturers, their profits are by no means excessive. One commentator analyzed the
pharmaceutical industry's profitability relative to the industry's fixed costs and found quite
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policy analyst, in discussing a comparable price rebate scheme for
Medicare,204 characterized the nature of the drug industry and the ef
fect of such a rebate as follows:
Pharmaceutical research is a very risky business. A number of independ
ent studies have f ound that between 5,000 and 10,000 compounds are

tried on average for every 1 that makes it into a neighborhood pharmacy.
And that one may be for a very tiny niche market. The incentive to en
gage in such intense research and development is the potential for large
profits on the few drugs that are successful. If the government limited
profits on the successes, then there would be fewer resources devoted to
research and development. This would translate into a reduced likeli
hood that tomorrow's cures will be developed. Last year, U.S. pharma

$24 billion of their revenues to research
new drugs. Jeopardizing such massive expenditures in the search for new
medications quite literally would threaten the health of America's sen
iors.205
ceutical manufacturers invested

The argument that present-day volume increases mitigate price
impact does not fully take into account the long-term and risk-based
nature of the drug industry. Any excessive price impact - no matter
how seemingly minimal - must be founded on an understanding of

the opposite: the industry's profitability is within 1 % of its real cost of capital. Stanton, supra
note 199, at 156 ("The common denominator by which to compare profit levels among dis
parate industries is to measure their internal rate of return (IRR). In a study comparing in
ternal rates of return from 1959 to 1973 among major industries, pharmaceuticals averaged
12.9% IRR, while chemicals averaged 9.1 %, petroleum averaged 10.8%, and the average
across all industries was 9.6%. More contemporary analyses have been done on the pharma
ceutical industry alone, finding an IRR of 11.1 % against the industry's average real cost of
capital of 10.5%. Thus the pharmaceutical industry's profitability is .within 1 % of its real cost
of capital, clearly not an excessive level of profitability."). Thus, a supplemental state rebate
compounded with the federal rebate will hinder research and development insofar as high
profitability cannot cover those losses.
204. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical
Marketplace, 66 Mo L. REV. 341, 346 (2001) ("In 1965, the federal government created the
Medicare program to provide public insurance to individuals from the age of sixty-five and
to those with certain disabilities, and joined with the states under the auspices of the Medi
caid program to extend health care coverage to those considered categorically or medically
needy.").
.

205. FROGUE, supra note 202; see also Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Returns
to R&D on New Drug Introductions in the 1980s, 13 J. HEA LTH ECON. 383 (1994) (finding in
their 1994 study that between 1980 and 1984, only 30% of pharmaceuticals generated returns
higher than their average after-tax research and development expenditures, and that the
20% of products with the highest revenues generated only 70% of returns during the study
time period.); F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceuti
cal Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 106 (1993) (finding in his study that 55% of industry
profits came from only 10% of pharmaceuticals); Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy
and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent
Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 373-74 (2000) ("Thus,
given the high costs and risks associated with 'drug research, companies must rely on a lim
ited number of highly successful products to finance their continuing R&D.").
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the long-term projections206 that manufacturers make and the poten
tially resultant billion dollar decreases in research and development
that could ensue.207 This is a detriment to the consumer, to society in
general, and to the Medicaid recipient which militates against the
value of lower prices. Lower prices may be a benefit to Medicaid re
cipients at first glance. The benefit, however, is severely undermined
by taking note of prescription drugs' small role in Medicaid vis-a-vis
the long-term repercussions on research and development.208 In this
light, the benefit must therefore be tempered when weighing it against
the burdens on interstate commerce.
In relation to the small benefits behind the statute, the burdens on
interstate commerce are significant. The most significant burden on
interstate commerce by the state prior authorization statutes is the
economic devastation in the form of lost profits to manufacturers.209
Consequently, any balancing test must take into account the profits
that manufacturers will lose due to the state regulation because of the
burdensome effects of such losses on the interstate prescription drug
market. The First Circuit in balancing the effects of the Maine statute,
however, refused to place these lost profits in the balance.210 The First
Circuit justified its refusal by citing to the Third Circuit case of Ford
Motor Company v. Insurance Commissioner211 as standing for the
proposition that "devastating economic consequences on a particular
interstate firm is not sufficient to rise to a Commerce Clause bur
den."212 Although a valid justification, after a closer reading of Ford
206. Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. Ass'n of America, Why A re Patents So Crucial?,
at http://innovation.phrma.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) ("[l]t often takes more than 15
years and more than $500 million to bring a new medicine to consumers.").
207. See Daniels, supra note 197, at B7 ("Drug research is probably the riskiest eco
nomic venture we know; only one of 5,000 possibilities researched ever becomes a marketed
product."); see also Mezrich, supra note 1 94, at 136 n.37 (noting the "inherent risk and ex
pense of R&D" and recounting the real possibility of a U.S. pharmaceutical corporation
"expending billions on R&D [and failing] to recoup their investment and end(ing] up bank
rupt").
208. See supra notes 1 93-207 and accompanying text.
209. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 84 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing the effect of lost profits on interstate commerce).
210. Id.
211. 874 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1989).
212. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 84 (internal quotations omitted). In addition, the First
Circuit noted the difficulty of weighing the possible effects - including the potential loss of
profits - instead of the actual effects of the statute. This seems to be more of a criticism of
the use of a balancing test in general rather than a separate j ustification for the court's fail
ure to consider lost profits (actual or possible). The court's recognition of the difficulties in
foreseeing the future is understandable. Nonetheless, the court's task requires such a prog
nosticative role under the balancing test employed in dormant commerce clause j urispru
dence for effects are not always visible and quantifiable upon first inspection. In any event,
this Note treats the First Circuit's complaint as separate from its refusal to balance lost prof
its and therefore does not consider it in the discussion of devastating economic conse
quences. For a general criticism of balancing, see Regan, supra note 42.
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Motor, the Third Circuit's rule does not apply in the present case for
two reasons.
First, Ford Motor invalidated the use of lost profits in the balance
because of the plaintiffs' impure motives in that case - an impurity
missing in the state prior authorization statutes. The Third Circuit
stated that the plaintiff companies213 in that case could not "hope to
invoke the Constitution at every tum to circumvent state regulation
and insure unrestricted expansion and protection of their opportunity
to obtain the greatest margin of profit."214 The court, in effect, utilized
a type of motive review215 and saw evidence of greedy corporate plain
tiffs who were seeking to break and circumvent the law for their own
gain.216 Consequently, this sort of "unclean hands" analysis must be
seen as driving the Third Ciicuit's rationale in excluding profits.217
Regardless of the validity of such analysis, in the case of state prior
authorization laws, manufacturers do not have this same impure mo
tive. The manufacturers already rebate their drugs below market-level
pursuant to the federal rebate provisions.218 Furthermore, as afore
mentioned, the federal rebate program started on the manufacturers'

213. The two plaintiffs were Ford Motor Company and United States Automobile
Association. Each plaintiff had a wholly independent and separate case, but the cases were
consolidated on appeal because of the factual and legal commonalities. Ford Motor Co., 874
F.2d at 929.
214. Id. at 944.
215. This should not be confused with the traditional meaning of motive review - a re
view of the legislative motives behind the passage of legislation - which is quite coinciden
tally employed frequently in assessing dormant commerce clause cases. See Regan, supra
note 42, at 1143-1160; see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (181 9). Motive review in the present context is more akin to an unclean hands
analysis - an examination of the party's actions and motives.
216. Plaintiffs were holding companies who acquired numerous savings and loan com
panies and their subsidiaries. Plaintiffs already owned various subsidiaries that were in the
business of selling insurance. Through the expansion of their corporate endeavors into the
realm of savings and loans, plaintiffs - with malice aforethought - were in clear violation
of a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting savings and loan companies from providing insurance
in that state. Ford Motor Co., 874 F.2d at 929-31 . Thus, from the facts of the case, the court
may have inferred that plaintiffs' widespread expansion, with the knowledge that such ex
pansion would place them in violation of Pennsylvania law, was an attempt to have their
cake and eat it too.
217. In fact, the Third Circuit began its analysis with a caveat that rather than drawing
attention away from the normative judgment it was making, simply placed a purposefully
thin veil over what was quite apparent. The court initially cautioned: "[The plaintiffs' corpo
rate] strategy is their own choosing and we express no value judgments concerning it." Ford
Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 943. Yet the court then proceeded to make those very value judg
ments by characterizing the companies as ones engaged in "unrestricted expansion" and
seeking "the greatest margin of profit." Id. Whether or not the court intended to poorly
mask the value judgments it later made is uncertain. Nonetheless, a close reading of Ford
Motor reveals motive review of plaintiffs' actions.
218. 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1396r-8 (West 2000) .
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own initiative.219 This is strong evidence that the pharmaceutical
manufacturers' motive is not entirely profit-seeking in nature. The
concern manufacturers have with state rebate statutes is that they are
excessive and may compromise the companies' abilities to research
and to develop new drugs - the lifeline of the drug industry.220 Be
cause Ford Motor employs an "unclean hands" analysis as a criterion
for disregarding lost profits, the rule of Ford Motor should not apply
to the pharmaceutical companies whose motives in the context of
Medicaid are more self-preserving than self-serving.221
The second distinction between Ford Motor and the present case is
the difference between interstate insurance and interstate pharmaceu
tical markets. The Third Circuit relied upon Exxon Corporation v.
Governor of Maryland222 in its analysis of the use of lost profits.223 The
Supreme Court in Exxon reasoned that because the Commerce Clause
protects the interstate market and not particular interstate firms from
burdensome regulations, the central inquiry is into the effects upon
the market.224 This is not to say that lost profits cannot affect the inter
state market and therefore gain relevancy. The Third Circuit recog
nized this salient point and characterized the Maryland market in
Exxon as one rich with an availability of substitutes; if refiners with
drew from the market, other interstate refiners would easily replace
them and thus the regulation would place no burden upon interstate
commerce.225 Similarly, the Third Circuit found in Ford Motor that if
the plaintiffs decided to leave the Pennsylvania market due to a de
crease in profits caused by the regulation, other interstate insurers
would take their place in the Pennsylvania market, and the burden
would be placed not on the interstate market, but only on the exiting
firms.226 Conversely, it follows that an absence of replacements for the
219. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 195-207 and accompanying text.
221. In examining the key differences between plaintiffs' motives in Ford Motor and the
present case, two additional points are noteworthy. First, in Ford Motor, 874 F.2d at 921-31,
the plaintiffs expanded their corporate endeavors into a completely new realm. See supra
note 216. The pharmaceutical manufacturers never altered their course of dealing. Second,
in Ford Motor, the statute was on the books and plaintiffs, with knowledge of the law, made
conscious business decisions to violate the statute. Id. The Maine Program was enacted long
after the pharmaceutical manufacturers had entered the Maine market. See supra note 16
and accompanying text. Thus, in the case of PhRMA, the manufacturers never engaged in
the same "unrestricted expansion" {change in business) designed to "circumvent state regu
lation" (with prior knowledge of the state statute) that the Third Circuit abhorred and con
sidered unclean. See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
222. 437 U.S. 1 1 7 (1978).
223. Ford Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 944.
224. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127-28.
225. Ford Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 944 (construing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127).
226. Id.
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exiting firms would burden interstate commerce, thereby making the
lost profits - and their effects on the market - a relevant item to be
balanced.
The pharmaceutical market operates with much less opportunity
for substitute goods than the insurance market found in Ford Motor,
and the lack of replacements in the pharmaceutical market thus forces
a court to balance lost profits. Research-based drug manufacturers
have patent protection over their innovative prescription drugs for a
number of years.227 Thus, if a manufacturer were to leave the Maine
market because of Maine's rebate provision and take its drug with it,
then presumably no one could replace that drug on the market due to
its patent protection. Although generic manufacturers may manufac
ture such drugs once the patents expire,228 generic manufacturers do
not serve as adequate replacements as far as Medicaid is concerned.
The most highly-sought after drugs by Medicaid recipients are the
newer, cutting-edge medications - drugs presumably not yet off pat
ent.229 Due to patent protection,230 the pharmaceutical market for each
prescription drug not off patent is monopolistic and therefore not re-

227. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West
2000) ; Innovation, Intellectual Property and Patents (2001), at http://www.innovation.phrma
.org/policy/2001-04-29.38.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) ("For new medicines, the effective
patent life for pharmaceuticals is actually closer to 11 or 12 years."); Prescription Drug Costs:
Federal Regulation of the Industry (2002), at http://www.bcbshealthissues.com/
proactive/newsroom/release.html?id,,,17521 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (discussing the Hatch
Waxman Act, Orphan Drug Act, and other relevant patent laws).
228. Hatch-Waxman Act: The Basics, at http://innovation.phrma.org/studyguides/
hwbasics.phtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) ("Once a brand name drug's patent expires, a copy
of the brand name drug can be manufactured and marketed, so long as it meets FDA re
quirements.").
229. Statement of Gerianne Hap, supra note 195 ("While spending for prescription
drugs under Medicaid has been rising, that is a result of more people using more and newer
medicines . . . . "). In addition to the newer research-drugs being hot commodities, these
drugs are the most expensive and consequently most targeted for rebates and other price
controls. See Stanton, supra note 199, at 150 ("The segment of the pharmaceutical market
most in need of price controls are those medicines under patent protection, since the patent
effectively limits or at least delays competition. Thus to be effective, government price con
trols must target patented drugs.").
230. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, 21 U.S.C.A. 335 (West 2000) .
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placeable by other interstate firms.231 This lack of substitution in the
pharmaceutical market distinguishes it from the Ford Motor market.232
Lost profits by pharmaceutical manufacturers and those profits' ef
fects upon the interstate market must be weighed in a dormant com
merce clause balancing test. Lost profits from the state rebate laws can
produce potentially devastating economic damage to the prescription
drug market by forcing manufacturers out of the market and leaving
no adequate replacement products.233 Medicaid patients would be left
without necessary drugs, or manufacturers would remain and sell re
bated drugs at a significant loss, eating away at research and develop
ment and future drug development.234 Both scenarios are unacceptable
and reflect the significant burden of lost profits that the prior authori
zation statutes impose upon interstate commerce.235 These losses rep
resent a serious burden to interstate commerce and tip the balance
against the state statutes.236
231. Quick Guide to Intellectual Property, at http:/linnovation.phrma.org/studyguides/
intellpropertyguide.phtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) ("Patents are the legal protection for
inventions, including new medicines discovered by research-based pharmaceutical compa
nies. A patent in the United States, as in most developed nations and many developing coun
tries, is a grant from the government to the inventor that essentially gives him or her the ex
clusive right to use and sell the invention for a defined number of years. At the heart of the
patent is the corresponding right to exclude others from making, using and selling the inven
tion.").
232. This analysis is more relevant for those pharmaceuticals without therapeutic substi
tutes and, as aforementioned, generally inapplicable to those drugs off-patent. See supra
notes 227-231 and accompanying text. Yet regulation - whether in the form of rebates or
other price controls - could serve to undermine the competition that does exist between
therapeutic substitutes/off-patent drugs and patented pharmaceuticals. See Patricia M.
Danzon & Li-Wei Chao, Does Regulation Drive Out Competition In Pharmaceutical Mar
kets? 43 J. L. & ECON. 311, 312 (2000) ("Generic market shares of off-patent products are
significantly higher in countries that permit (relatively) free pricing, such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, than in countries with strict price or reimburse
ment regulation, such as France, Italy, and Japan.").
233. See supra notes 227-232 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.
235. In fact, the first scenario - Medicaid patients left without necessary drugs - is al
ready a reality. In response to the Michigan prior authorization statute, six of the world's
largest drug companies entered into a collusive boycott by refusing to rebate their drugs un
der the Michigan statute. Gold et al., supra note 11 (reporting that the six boycotting com
panies are "Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis; Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, N.J.; Merck;
Pfizer; Pharmacia Corp., Peapack, N.J.; and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the prescription
drug unit of American Home Products Corp., Madison, N.J."). Boycotts such as these illus
trate the long-term ramifications of prior authorization insofar as manufacturers are willing
to give up present market share presumably in order to curb a long-term economically dev
astating scheme. Id. Further, consider the potential for similar boycotts in light of the fact
that numerous other states and even private health insurance companies plan on imple
menting similar prior authorization programs. Id.; see also Maine Appeals Halt on its R.x
Plan, supra note 26 (stating that roughly twenty-eight other states are planning to introduce
legislation similar to Maine's).
236. A critical inquiry in dormant commerce clause cases - specifically in the case of
extraterritorial statutes - is "what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State
adopted similar legislation." Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1998). Presumably if lost
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Finally, the state prior authorization statutes fail under a balancing
test because the burdens on interstate commerce are magnified when
one recognizes PhRMA as a politically discriminated against group
that deserves judicial protection.237 This argument is a variation on a
theme238 first expressed in famous footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Company.239 At first glance, considering PhRMA
- a group that accounts for more than 75 percent of brand-name drug
sales in the United States240 - a "discrete and insular"241 group seems
counterintuitive. Yet rather than focusing upon the "discrete and inprofits are considered in light of this principle, then the burden greatly increases in degree,
and any "possible effects" become much more real and even inevitable.
237. Courts in general should consider the political processes in a dormant commerce
clause query. Although political concerns are not traditionally an item to be placed into the
burden/benefit balance, a court's concern with preserving political processes shows the moti
vating factor behind the inquiry and consequently serves as the primary justification to bal
ance in the first place. See Regan, supra note 42, at 1166 (noting the traditional Carolene
Products scholar's argument that the Carotene Products dormant commerce clause theory
provides the justification for balancing). For example, if a court were to determine that the
purpose of the dormant commerce clause is to prohibit protectionism, then the decision to
balance and everything within the balance would be viewed through anti-protectionist
glasses. Regan advocates the primacy of protectionism (yet by no means endorses balanc
ing). Id. Similarly, if a court were to consider protecting the politically under-represented as
a principal dormant commerce clause concern, a court would use its discretion in weighing
the balance in order to tip in favor of the under-represented. Thus, the glasses that the court
wears will help give meaning to the items already placed on the scales. To put it another
way, it may be much more important to choose the right balance than to choose the right
items of measure. (Of course, the added meaning of a political theory is also pertinent in an
extraterritorial analysis. Due to the large discretion in a balancing test, however, a court may
be able to better serve its purposes in this context rather than in an extraterritorial setting a reason why the political analysis js discussed here and not earlier).
The political process balance is one of great significance as far as the dormant commerce
clause is concerned mainly because it is a political theory that can solve the federal-state and
separation-of-powers problems inherent in dormant commerce clause cases. See Mark
Tushnet, Rethinking The Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 164-65. This
becomes especially pertinent in the present case because of federalism's special role in
Medicaid. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Thus, in choosing the appropriate
balance, the political process balance must be given strong consideration.
238. The variation is based on Professor Bruce Ackerman's view of Carolene Products.
Professor Ackerman eschews the "discrete and insular" language of Carotene Products and
argues that the true focus in examining political dysfunction should be on those groups that
are prejudiced, regardless of their discreteness or insularity. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond
Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
239. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition . . . curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinar
ily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.").
240. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and other Relief at para. 8, Pharm. Research
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows, 184 F.Supp.2d 1186 (N.D. Fl. 2001) {No. 4:01cv356-ws).
241. The terms "discrete" and "insular" are probably open to differing and controversial
meanings. This Note, however, adopts the sensible sociological definitions advanced by Pro
fessor Ackerman. Thus, "insularity" describes the "tendency of group members to interact
with great frequency in a variety of social contexts." Ackerman, supra note 238, at 726. A
group is considered "discrete" "when its members are marked out in ways that make it rela
tively easy for others to identify them." Id. at 729.
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sular" language of Carolene Products, PhRMA deserves protection as
justified by the language in the footnote protecting those who languish
under the burden of prejudice. PhRMA is a group prejudiced against
in the political processes and therefore should be judicially pro
tected.242 Rather than attempt to suggest that PhRMA possesses the
characteristics of either a discrete or insular group, this Note argues
that the reasoning behind Carotene Products does not stand for the
protection only of the discrete and insular, but also of "politically inef
fective majorities." As PhRMA is one such ineffective group, it de
serves the special attention of the court.243
The "prejudice" language of Carolene Products is sometimes ig
nored to the detriment of the under-represented.244 Therefore, politi
cally ineffective majorities that feel the impact of society's prejudice
and are ineffective because of this prejudice, often find themselves
without a voice in the formulation of laws that affect them.245 If
Carolene Products is truly concerned with political dysfunction, then it
is the disdain for prejudice which should serve to protect both the "dif
fuse and anonymous" as well as the "insular and discrete."246 As one
scholar queries, "Why should the concern with . 'prejudice' justify
Carolene's narrow fixation upon 'discrete and insular' minorities?"247
Simply put, it should not.248 If a group is ineffective in the legislative
242. See infra notes 249-250, 254.
243. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for
special judicial attention for prejudiced groups); Ackerman, supra note 238.
244. Ackerman, supra note 238, at 731 ("Carotene's empirical inadequacy stems from its
underinclusive conception of the impact of prejudice upon American society.").
245. See Ackerman, supra note 238, at 722-23.
246. Id. at 724.
247. Id. at 732.
248. See ELY, supra note 243, at 153 {noting that prejudice properly addresses the un
constitutional motivations of the legislature, whereas discreteness and insularity do not).
Insularity and discreteness may even be advantageous in the political arena, especially
relative to those prejudiced against. As Professor Ackerman posits, the problem with the
language of Carotene Products is that it "disdains the easy case in its eagerness to pronounce
on harder ones." Ackerman, supra note 238, at 722-23. Insular and discrete groups normally
have tremendous bargaining advantages, id. at 723-24, and thus to offer protection to such
groups was a bold and broad stroke by the Court. The bargaining advantages of an insular
and discrete group come in the form of increased political resources and lower organiza
tional costs relative to an anonymous and diffuse group. Id. at 726. As Professor Ackerman
explains, insularity "will help breed sentiments of group solidarity." Id. at 725. Thus, a group
that possesses solidarity is more likely to make symbolic contributions for political purposes.
Id. Moreover, a group's insularity can easily lead to the exposure of non-contributing free
riders and thereby increase resources by curbing free-riding. Id. In way of organizational
costs, insular groups have pre-existing channels of communication and therefore find it
cheaper to organize. Id. at 726. Similarly, a discrete group - due to the ease of recognition
of members - will find it cheaper and easier to organize. Id. at 730-31; see also ELY, supra
note 243, at 157-60.
The absence of language supporting "the easy cases," however, does not foreclose appli
cation of the principle to those cases. An observation of the case law concludes that Carotene
Products is more concerned with political weakness propagated by attacks on egalitarianism
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forum due to widespread and systematic prejudice, then that group more than any other - must be protected under the spirit of Carolene
Products.
PhRMA is a victim of prejudice and should thus be protected in
the political processes. The portrayal of drug companies as "evil" and
"profit-seeking" by members of the media and even high-ranking po
litical leaders249 has seemingly undermined their political power.250
Although it is difficult to examine the motives of and influences upon
the enacting state legislatures,251 the mere evidence of widespread so
cietal prejudice against drug companies gives rise to the inference of
unconstitutional, prejudicial motivations behind the state prior
authorization statutes.252 Moreover, a mere inference would be ample
to justify a more searching judicial inquiry under Carolene Products.253
The inference is further strengthened by PhRMA's ineffectiveness in
preventing the passage of the Maine Program in spite of its strenuous

than with the weakness of the single insular group. Ackerman, supra note 238, at 723. The
opportunity for all to equally participate in the political processes, and not the nature of the
group denied participation, is at the core of Carotene Products. See ELY, supra note 243, at
77 (arguing that the focus of Carotene Products is "whether the opportunity to participate
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommo
dated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been unduly con
stricted").
249. See Robert Pear, U.S. Backs Florida Plan to Cut Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2001, at A14 ("Governor Bush, a Republican, denounced the lawsuit. 'Protecting the large
profit margins of multibillion (dollar] pharmaceutical companies is not a priority,' he said.");
Maggie Gallagher, Goring My Health and Yours, TOWNHALL.COM, Sept. 15, 2000, at
http:f/www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg2000915/shtml (discussing former
Vice-president Al Gore's characterization of drug companies as "evil" during his 2000 presi
dential campaign); Michael Fumento, Goring Drug Companies: A Plan That Doesn't Help
the Elderly, NAT L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2000, at http:f/www.fumento.com/gorecampaign.
html (discussing Gore's negative depiction of drug companies).
'

250. See Philip Morrising the Drug Companies - Part 3, para. 1 1 , at http:f/www.
yourdoctorinthefamily.com/commentary/comm017.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) ("[W]hat
we are actually seeing is yet another escalation of the war against drug companies, a war that
will follow the model of the war recently waged against big tobacco. And the first step of
such a war (as in any war) is to dehumanize the enemy so that it's okay to slaughter them.");
Stephanie Stapleton, A MA: Science must be key in off-label drug information,
AMEDNEWS.COM, Aug. 18, 1997, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_97/
pick0818.htm (" 'The FDA has felt that drug companies are evil monsters out there to dupe
the physicians,' said John Seigfried, MD, deputy vice president for scientific and regulatory
affairs for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America."); Key Martin,
"Medications

For

Every

Nation"/ Pills

Cost

Pennies,

Greed

Costs

Lives,

at

http:f/www.peoplesvideo.org/hiv_dc.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) (discussing the view that
drug companies seek profits at the expense of human lives).
251. See ELY, supra note 243, at 138 ("[D]etermining whether an illegitimate motivation
influenced a decision can be very difficult.").
252. Id. (noting that there will be situations where a "responsible inference that the ac
tion was unconstitutionally motivated will be possible").
253. Id. ("[I]t often will not be possible responsibly to conclude that the challenged ac
tion was the product of an unconstitutional motivation, (but that does not mean] . . . that the
inquiry should not be undertaken.").
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lobbying efforts and organizational advantages.254 Ultimately, the in
ference of prejudice - an inference based on vociferous anti-PhRMA
statements by political leaders and a war-like rhetoric by media and
grass-roots groups against the drug industry255 - seems strong enough
to be of concern to a Carolene Products court. Therefore, at the very
least, the prejudice factor should be considered in a balancing test and
should tip in favor of PhRMA in order to preserve the talismanic po
litical processes.
Under a balancing test that measures the burdens and benefits of a
state law on interstate commerce, the state statutes must be struck
down as unconstitutional. The perceived local benefits of lower prices
for Medicaid recipients are not of great significance. In fact, these
benefits may actually serve to undermine pharmaceutical research and
development and thus hurt these same consumers in the future.
Moreover, the burdens of potential lost profits by manufacturers on
the interstate market militate against upholding the statutes. Finally,
the more searching judicial inquiry of a revised Carotene Products
theory suggests protection of PhRMA as an ineffective and persecuted
interest group within the political processes. This protection is the fi
nal constitutional determinate in tipping the balance and demonstrat
ing the excessive burden of the state statutes relative to the statutes'
minimal benefits.
CONCLUSION

This Note concludes that state prior authorization statutes run con
trary to the congressional intent behind prior authorization - an in
tent that clearly calls for the use of prior authorization to curb unnec
essary over-prescription. By utilizing a purposive interpretive theory,
254. PhRMA, for example, waged a vociferous advertising campaign in Maine protest
ing the Maine Program, yet the law passed quite easily. See Page, supra note 198. In general,
PhRMA has been unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts recently despite the expenditure of vast
sums of money. For example, in 1999, the pharmaceutical industry was Washington's top
lobbying spender, yet it failed to achieve its primary goal of obtaining a tax credit for re
search and development. See Pharma lobbying figures from the Center for Responsive Poli
tics, at http:/llists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-June/ 001110.htm (last visited
June 4, 2001).
Moreover, PhRMA's localized lobbying losses - as exemplified in Maine - are more
indicative of a prejudice at the state level. The inference of prejudice within state legislatures
is in part based on the fact that state budgetary pressures serve as incentives for states to act
upon public hostility towards pharmaceutical companies. See John Sanko, Medicaid Costs
Threaten Budget; Legislators Struggle with Runaway Costs for State Health Insurance,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7391966 (" 'Medicaid was

driving most states' budgets into the red, even before the additional economic downturn that
resulted from the Sept. 11 attack,"analyst Alexis Senger told lawmakers." Moreover, ac
cording to Senger, 36 states reported Medicaid over-expenditures in fiscal 2001 of up to 19.7
percent). Although PhRMA's lobbying losses are hardly conclusive in demonstrating any
prejudicial effect, they may have some probative value in drawing an inference of prejudice.
255. See supra notes 249-250 and accompanying text.
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congressional intent becomes more apparent in light of the greater le
gal context of Medicaid. Therefore, federal law must preempt such
statutes.
Moreover, this Note demonstrates that state prior authorization
statutes violate the dormant commerce clause as being extraterritorial
regulations, as well as failing under a balancing test where the burdens
on commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefits. Although
not a traditional Carolene Products group, PhRMA never received a
fair shake in the hostile and prejudiced political arena which gave
birth to the Maine Program. With the judicial concern for advancing
fair representation of prejudiced and ineffective groups in the political
fora in mind, the excessiveness of the burdens upon interstate com
merce becomes evident. Due to the constitutional limitations upon
state prior authorization statutes, they cannot serve as appropriate
legislative means to further the interests of Medicaid and its recipients.
The Maine Program is a regulatory scheme with a noble ideal. Yet
in its efforts to further the interests of its Medicaid recipients, Maine
undermines the interests of all. Maine's program is not only unconsti
tutional, but it also hinders health care and restricts long-term phar
maceutical research and development. The Supreme Court now awaits
to settle this dispute. At stake could be the future of health care in this
country as we know it.

